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CALIFORNIA AND THE PACIFIC RIM COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE 
INTRODUCTION 
California faces a critical juncture in our history. 
Fue by a national recession, a 
industrial growth in the Pacific, global 
ifying. Global technology diffusion and 
our historical comparative advantages in 
California's continued 
strategic partnerships with 
resources, yielding access 
international markets. 
economic vitality requires 
Pacific Rim manufacturing and 
to growing Pacific Rim and 
unique comparative in geography, 
diversity, California must leverage its role 
hub of industrial, academic, and cultural exchange 
Pacific Rim. In turn, our unique ethnic diversity promises 
long-term interpersonal and societal network linkages throughout 
Pacific Rim. 
Senate Pacific Rim Committee 
January 7, 1991 
The potential beneficial economic effects of accessing growing 
Pacific export markets merit particular attention. 
By the year 2000, as Japan and the Four Tigers, Taiwan, Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, evolve into more mature, consumer-driven 
economies, these markets will provide 13 million net new consumers 
for California exports. Newly emerging countries of Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines will provide 68 million, 
with China providing 100 million. 
The trade statistics are compelling. California's exports to 
the growing Pacific Rim, not including Canada and Latin America, 
as a whole grew by 18%, from $17.5 billion to $20.7 billion in 
1989. Exports to Australia grew at 30%; Korea, 24%, Taiwan 23%, 
and Japan, 20.5%. However, California suffers a trade deficit with 
the region of over $33 billion, $21 billion of which is 
attributable to Japan. 
With a weakening dollar, California exports should and must 
increase, capturing growth opportunities in the Pacific Rim. 
These circumstances highlight the strategic importance of the 
Pacific Rim. The prospect of strategic partnerships with Pacific 
Rim manufacturing and capital resources, combined with market 
access to robust Pacific Rim economies promises continuing growth 
and prosperity for California. 
However, we face enormous challenges and seemingly endless 
questions: 
* How competitive are California products and services 
within the Pacific Rim? 
* What role must California public sector institutions play 
in enhancing the state's competitive position? 
* How can we best leverage our competitive advantages in 
higher education and technological competence? 
* How do we translate our advantages of ethnic linkage, 
scientific and technological prowess, and sheer market 
size into market access and economic growth? 
* What is the appropriate role for public policy leaders 
of the State of California? 
These are questions political and business leaders of 
California must answer. 
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ISSUE: PACIPIC RIM INTEGRATION - CALIPORHIA AS LBADBR 
cross-border Public/Private Strategic Linkage Formation 
California leads all other states in the process of economic 
integration in the Pacific Rim. California businesses have 
significant operations in Asia and Latin America. Asian businesses 
tend to congregate in California. To the extent that Pacific Rim 
developments disproportionately affect California, as a state, 
California public and private policy leaders must become 
increasingly active in international policy developments in the 
Pacific Rim. 
California public and private sector decisionmakers are 
uniquely positioned to provide invaluable input into the 
institutional process of managing economic integration. California 
institutions, public and private, comprise a unique force for 
information dissemination, consultation, and policy development. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the u.s. National Committee 
for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) works 
closely with business, academic, and government sectors of 
California. A related effort, the official government-to-
government Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process for 
stimulating economic integration in the region, began last year. 
APEC is led in the u.s. by Secretary of State James Baker. 
Recognizing that, unlike Europe, Pacific Rim integration is being 
led by economic, not political, forces, Baker has suggested that 
APEC collaborate with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 
{PECC), a consortium of top business, government, and academic 
leaders throughout the Pacific Rim. 
California policy leaders, public and private must be prepared 
to fully participate in these supranational policy arenas, at a 
level commensurate to the state's status as a leading economic, 
political, social, and cultural force in the Pacific Rim. 
In the october 29, 1990 hearing of the Senate Select Committee 
on the Pacific Rim, as in previous discussions, the leadership of 
the u.s. National Committee of PECC invited the legislative and 
executive leadership of the state to explore collaborative 
arrangements with the PECC, to actuate the unique leadership role 
within the Pacific Rim for which the State is clearly positioned. 
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Pacific Rim. Latin America, and the Free Trade Movement 
In this context, any definition of the Pacific Rim must 
include Mexico and Latin America. In the past year, Chile, Mexico, 
and Peru became the first Latin American members of the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council (PBEC), a leading organization of top 
Pacific industry leadership. Next spring, the PECC also plans to 
fully admit Pacific Latin American nations. 
In view of the emerging US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, the 
impact on California-based employment and industrial 
competitiveness, as a consequence of "back door" market access 
provided to foreign, particularly, Japanese manufacturers, remains 
a critical question. Competition from Asian products manufactured 
in Latin America, particularly Mexico, and imported into California 
will accelerate. 
Driving forces towards this economic trend include lower labor 
costs and preferential access to California markets. These trends 
are facilitated by federal initiatives toward Western Hemisphere 
trade liberalization. Risks of protectionist u.s. public 
sentiment, including environmental factors, may motivate cross-
border cooperation with California. 
President Bush is aggressively pursuing his "Enterprise for 
Americas" initiative to assist Latin American renaissance, in part 
to address Latin American debt problems. As u.s. efforts toward 
a North American Free Trade and Latin American Free Trade Zones 
accelerate, California interests must be effectively represented. 
Whether there are opportunities and benefits to accrue to 
California residents and industry in this phenomenon also remains 
a question to be addressed. 
The dominance of Texas private and public policy leaders in 
this national effort is an indication of how much is at risk if we 
do not aggressively command our best role as this international 
economic drama unfolds. 
iv 
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ACTION: 
Explore formal collaboration between the State of California and 
supranational policy bodies such as the PECC. Create a vehicle for 
collaboration among executive and legislative leaders for purposes 
of participation in the PECC and activities of other appropriate 
policy entities critically affecting the state, including the 
Office of the u.s. Secretary of Commerce, among others. Primary 
mandates should include legislative and executive policy and 
programmatic ramifications of: 
* The North American (particularly US-Mexico) Free Trade 
Agreement, including effective articulation in Washington of 
California interests, taking fully into consideration Pacific 
Rim factors including: 
competitive implications of backdoor market access by 
Asian, particularly Japanese, manufacturers; 
conversely, opportunities for strategic alliances among 
California's small and medium-sized enterprises with 
Japanese and other foreign manufacturers both for access 
to capital for globally competitive cross-border 
production and for access to target export markets: 
seaport and airport and other transportation 
infrastructural development needs, including offshore 
(Asian and other) financing opportunities: 
all other implications for the state's global 
competitiveness, including impact on the agricultural 
sector, industrial employment and employability, external 
economic effects of increased export market development 
opportunities, and interstate and cross-border 
competition in the manufacturing sector: and 
* The need for a statewide strategic plan for technology 
development and deployment (Chapter 1230: Farr, Vasconcellos, 
Baker, Torres) and the cultivation of a global applied 
technology information infrastructure (Chapter 1687: Farr, 
Vasconcellos, Baker, Torres) , promoting strategic partnerships 
between California and our global counterparts, in a manner 
consistent with the strategic plan, as described below. 
v 
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AND 
Business and government leaders i ask how the 
state economy can most effectively compete with the 
economies which will dominate the future of the Pacific 
state of California must seriously be prepared to 
supporting the entrepreneurial initiatives of our 
of higher education 
sector, better integrating market , 
technological knowhow of employees, production processes, product 
applied , ic 
Support for these efforts will generate meaningful 
economic opportunities for Californians. 
to pervasive 
notably including 
a 
the long-term 
capital to Asia and Latin 
technologically competitive 
target market 
In contrast, historically, 
globally distinctive 
, facilitating the 
applications. 
institutions of 
sector, 
engineering, and other scienti 
entrepreneurial human resources. 
Some 
migration 
attracted 
possessed 
science and 
research, 
technological, and 
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Ironically,· recent changes 
environment underscore an increasingly 
California's international strategic , 
particularly in science and engineering. Cal •s technology 
industries face a significant shortage of trained scientists, 
engineers, and technologists, in the laboratories and on the 
factory floors. The adequacy of public and private financial 
support for education and technical literacy in the workforce 
warrants close inspection. This issue is concern 
all California communities, economical 
disenfranchised populations. 
By comparison, Japan 1 s corporations heavily support 
resource development and technological education. The societal and 
financial framework of Japan provides an ability among companies 
to treat.labor as "capital". Key Japanese corporations are highly 
leveraged with long-term financing from large industrial banks. 
Japanese banks own more than 22% of corporate equity in Japan. 
Therefore, Japanese corporations enjoy the availability of 
relatively low interest debt and the benefits of low after-tax 
of capital after interest deductions. In addition, the same 
financial institutions spread capital holdings among members of the 
same historical industrial group, a 
for low dividend pay-out rates. 
This configuration 
to be responsive to the short-term 
ic stock market. Therefore, Japanese managers are able to 
more flexible with regard to the "strategic ization" 
labor, including, training costs. In addition, the lack 
opportunity for lateral labor mobility means that corporate 
managers can count on employees staying in place for very 
not lifetime, commitments. As a result, are 
retrained, and cross-trained over a lifetime by the 
sector. 
By contrast, American corporations must treat labor as 
dispensable "expenses" in order to remain responsive to the short-
term return requirements of public shareholders. High lateral 
mobility among California employees, a virtue of our free-market 
economy, yields comparatively lower investments by American 
corporations in developing human resources, both managerial and 
labor. 
vii 
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Therefore, Cali of higher education, 
particularly public institutions, play a unique role in supporting 
the needs of California businesses for a well-educated and 
technologically competent force of employees. Yet, public coffers 
run dry. The private sector bears an equally unique responsibility 
to support education. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the efficacy of 
the math science component of the state's K-12 education system 
pales in comparison to our Pacific Rim counterparts, yet public 
funds continue to be constrained. Whereas, in Japan, math and 
science education is universally emphasized at all levels of 
capabilities, in the face of budgetary constraints, there are 
increasing pressures in the United States to shepherd limited math 
and science and related educational technology resources towards 
readily identifiable gifted and high achieving students. 
As a result, while California continues to excel in yielding 
innovators, the technical literacy of the workforce, as a whole, 
falls short of the an increasingly technological 
workplace, subject to fying global competition. Moreover, 
numbers of students through to attain PhD's in science, 
math, and engineering fail to meet projected demand. Recognizing 
these challenges, the National Science Foundation, the National 
Academy of Sciences, and the American Electronics Association place 
K-12 science and math education as primary priorities. 
In the October 29, 1990 of the Senate Select Committee 
Pacific Rim, Dr. c. Atkinson, Chancellor of the 
of California at San Diego and former Director of the 
Science Foundation (NSF), projects "significant shortfalls 
between supply and demand for the next several decades at both the 
baccalaureate and Ph.D. levels" in the United States. Chancellor 
Atkinson pointed to a recent NSF study, The State of Academic 
=-='-"'-'==---'==--====-=::::.=:..==' projects an average annual shortfall 
between 1995 and 2010 the total supply of Ph.D.'s in the natural 
and engineering of nearly 50% of conservatively projected 
demand in the United States. Atkinson asserts that "if we believe 
that education and research are critical for economic growth, 
international competitiveness, advances in health care, and 
national security ... prudence suggests ... that we pursue intervention 
strategies" at the K-12, baccalaureate, and Ph.D. levels. 
viii 
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As an outcome of our , California has 
traditionally yielded brilliant innovators. However, the linkage 
between basic innovation and commercialization is discontinuous, 
with innovators seeking technological "breakthroughs", often 
without the support of long-term capital. Consequently, innovators 
seek strategic partnerships with corporate, including foreign, 
partners possessing substantial market access, cash flow, and long-
term capital. 
The ability to integrate intelligence regarding market needs 
into the innovation process yields a capacity to produce a balance 
of short-term commercializable products yielding cash flow to 
support long-term scientific technological innovation. 
Senate Pacific Rim Committee 
The American system of autonomous, fragmented entrepreneurship, 
while arguably crucial for creativity and innovation, remains 
structurally disconnected from the product commercialization 
process. The vertically integrated Japanese manufacturing value 
chain infrastructures tend to integrate market intelligence, 
production, and product design processes, while purchasing basic 
innovation and research. 
Against this backdrop, foreign, including Asian, investment 
in California provides opportunity for survival and success for 
innovative California entrepreneurs, both academic and industrial. 
Significantly, such strategic partners often comprise foreign 
enterprises which may exercise dominating power over sources of 
innovation. 
The risk exists, therefore, that Californians may lose control 
over central corporate decisionmaking, including location of 
manufacturing facilities and terms of technology transfer. The 
global diffusion of technological knowhow, whether in Singapore, 
Japan, or Belgium, means that Cali 's comparative advantages 
in technological innovation may diminish commensurately. This has 
already occurred in the field of production and process 
technologies and organizational techniques. 
Technological preeminence of the Pacific Rim workforce already 
cannot be denied. However, organizational approaches and other 
technical benefits of the Pacific experience appear to be 
transferrable and adaptable to various cultural settings, as 
evidenced by success stories throughout Asia, and more recently, 
Mexico. 
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Cali 
are 
and California 
key production 
and selected state 
collaborate with Pacific Rim 
reciprocal transfer of 
knowhow, enhancing our 
manufacturing human resource 
promising economic development 
Examples of current, 
efforts, integrating human 
development, technology 
priorities within Cali 
include the California 
Network (ED>Net) and the Connect 
global market access 
of higher education, 
Colleges Economic Development 
Program at the University of 
California at San 
Just as competitive strategies 
specific to the needs of each , and just as Japqn 
executes "seisaku sangyo" industrial strategy, the time 
has come both for the State of California to begin to draft a 
coherent, comprehensive California strategy for technological 
competitiveness for debates which the process will 
certainly engender. 
ACTIONS: 
Implement b now enacted into law, 
created in 1990 Farr, Assemblyman Baker, 
Minority Leader, Assemblyman Vasconcellos, Chairman of the Assembly 
Ways and Means Committee and Senator Art Torres, Chairman of the 
Senate Select Committee on the among other leaders in 
the legislature in close the Administration, in 
Administration and address the need for: 
* a statewide for technology development and 
deployment (Chapter 1230) and 
of a 
( 
partnerships between 
in a manner consistent 
These new statutes call 
pilot programs and overseas 
medium-sized businesses and 
develop cross-border linkages 
capital markets. 
technology information 
promoting strategic 
and our global counterparts, 
the strategic plan. 
for publicjprivate collaboration in 
X 
working with our small and 
of higher education to 
access international product and 
Senate Pacific Rim Committee 
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Through Chapter 1230, 2 I A strategic 
Plan for Technology Development the State of 
California can foster the and long-term 
policy strategies for technology development and deployment, while 
identifying promising initiatives California 
addressing the need for programs, focusing on 
human resource development The pilot programs would 
reflect collaboration among entities and institutions of 
higher education, including the California Community Colleges 
Economic Development Network (ED>Net). The new statute aims at 
generating a roadmap for stimulating California's economic vitality 
and global competitiveness, ful 1 i 's yet untapped 
potential in economic development. 
Chapter 1687, the recently enacted Global Applied Technology 
Extension Service (GATES) statute, enhances and clarifies the roles 
of the World Trade Commission and the Governor 1 s Coordinating 
Council for International Programs, as follows: 
* To help develop and coordinate statewide public information 
and consultative resources, including the ongoing efforts of 
state agencies and institutions higher education to 
address global technological competitiveness and trade; 
* To develop linkages and with counterpart 
educational, public and private institutions globally, in part 
by "deputizing" collaborative efforts among California public 
and private sector and professionals operating 
abroad in affiliation with GATES; 
* To assist technology transfer and market development efforts 
of the private sector, with particular attention to the needs 
of small and medium-sized enterprises for easy access to 
pertinent and timely public information. 
Pursuant to Section 15364.23 of the statute, the Governor's 
Coordinating Council for International Programs may need to assume 
direct responsibility for GATES in order to facilitate integration 
of the significant, yet uncoordinated, advances already developed 
among state agencies. The viability of this approach remains a 
subject of legislative oversight and inquiry. 
Pacific Rim government representatives have expressed strong 
enthusiasm about linking their technology needs with integrated 
resources in California. The State of California may, in this 
manner, enhance market access in difficult markets, particularly 
for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Senate Pacific Rim 
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• . GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 
One example an 
add substantial value 
energy/environmental 
energy and environmental 
agricultural biosciences. 
can yield major 
Global 
to achieve a 
responsibility. New 
consistently derived 
efforts. 
TECHNOLOGY 
of California can 
developments is the 
global leader in 
innovations, including 
government collaboration 
businesses. 
for global cooperation 
and environmental 
for energy conversion are 
industries. 
economic development 
Indonesia, the 
Philippines, 
deforestation practices. 
reached epic proportions 
domestic environmental ( 
, are criticism for 
Sulphuric coal-related air pollution has 
production and 
from Latin America 
Accordingly, 
interest in 
reforestation, 
technologies from Cali 
the question of "environmental 
The State 
economically viable 
through 
opportunities for 
According to the 
Latin America, and 
commercially viable 
Moreover, the juxtaposition of 
in agricultural 
of agricultural imports 
controversial. 
officials clearly express 
knowhow, including 
, and alternative energy 
expressed an interest in 
11 economic development. 
or role in providing 
transfer. Technology 
coincide with export 
Asia/Pacific, 
express needs for 
technologies, addressing 
demand for low-cost energy use 
diverse, reliable, secure energy 
benefits. 
indigenous resources, 
, and positive environmental 
The Energy Commission 
small and medium-sized 
technological goods and 
solar, thermal, wind, 
hydroelectric, cogeneration, 
Export Program assists 
businesses to export 
technologies include 
, photovoltaic, small 
and conservation. 
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"Alternative energy businesses have emerged in California as 
a multi-billion dollar industry. includes an estimated 1,500 
firms manufacturing, selling and servicing a wide array of 
technologies and products. In fact, this industry accounts for 50 
to 90 percent of the u.s. market for several major alternative 
energy technologies." 
As exemplified by the energy/environmental field, California 
public policy decisionmakers must maintain an environment enabling 
California-based small and medium-sized enterprises to fully 
exploit distinctive comparative advantages in competing for 
lucrative Pacific Rim markets. 
ACTION: 
Initiate the Global Applied Technology Extension Service 
(GATES), as authorized in Chapter 1687 of the Statutes of 1990, 
with an initial focus on the environmental technology sector. 
Through GATES, stimulate private sector participation in developing 
cross-border database and networks, by integrating existing 
communications infrastructure with existing institutional and 
interpersonal market intelligence available among state and federal 
agencies, institutions of higher education, and the private sector. 
Pursuant to Section 15364.23 of the statute, the Governor's 
Coordinating Council for International Programs may need to assume 
direct responsibility for GATES in order to facilitate integration 
f the significant, yet uncoordinated, advances already developed 
among state agencies. State agency efforts in the environmental 
technology field include, but are not limited to the Energy 
Commission Technology Export Program, the Department of Commerce 
Environmental Technology Program, and the World Trade Commission 
marketing programs with various public and private initiatives in 
information dissemination including: 
* California Education and Research Federation Network (CERFNet) 
at the San Diego Supercomputer at uc San Diego, 
* Pacific Rim Commercial Exchange Project at CSU Sacramento, 
* MEMEX Institute Project at csu Chico, 
* California Community College EDNet System, and 
* various related private sector initiatives. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the Pacific Rim integrates and global competition 
intensifies, are California public policy interests adequately 
represented, particularly as pertain to market access, 
technological competitiveness, and environmental stewardship? 
Access to these Pacific Rim markets requires adroit strategic 
alliances among California entities and Pacific Rim counterparts. 
In this context, Cali faces a paramount need to enhance 
foreign languagejcultural literacy, technological learning, and 
international business competence of its human resources. Focused 
collaboration and information networking among industry, academic, 
and government sectors will be increasingly vital. 
Our government and business leaders need the will to lead. 
The public certainly expects that California will capture our full 
share in the world's richest trading region, the Pacific Rim. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
CHAIRMAN ART TORRES: I would like to get started on time 
because we have a number of subject matter areas to review and 
also to receive input from. This is the first of a series of 
hearings and conferences planned for the 1991 session exploring 
the role of California within the Pacific Rim. Today's hearing 
will focus on: 
1) describing current movements toward economic, cooperation, 
and strategic partnerships among business, academic, and 
government sectors throughout the Pacific Rim region; and 
2) ensuring that California interests including market access, 
technological competitiveness and environmental stewardship are 
adequately represented in current regional business and economic 
policy developments. 
The hearing will help, I hope, to find an effective 
leadership role for California policy decision makers in 
facilitating cross border economic cooperation throughout the 
Pacific Rim to the benefit of California. We have invited, I 
believe, expert witnesses from government, industry, and academia 
to assist this Committee in setting the stage for the Legislature 
once it reconvenes in January of 1991. 
I would like to thank Chancellor Atkinson of the University 
of California at San Diego and Dean Gourevitch of the Graduate 
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies for hosting 
this hearing. I'm certain that this hearing reflects a long-term 
collaboration to come with the University and this Committee. 
The official government-to-government Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) process for stimulating economic integration in 
the region began last year, led in the United States by our own 
Secretary of State, James Baker. Recognizing that unlike Europe, 
Pacific Rim integration will be led by the private sector, Baker 
has suggested that APEC collaborate with the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (PECC), a consortium of top business, 
government and academic leaders throughout the Pacific Rim. 
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In the past year, Chile, Mexico and Peru 
Latin American members of the Pacific Basin 
(PBEC}, which is a leading organization of 
leaders. The role of the State of California 
point, to be explored. Competition from 
manufactured in Latin America and imported into 
accelerate. There is no doubt about it. 
became the first 
Economic Council 
Pacific Industry 
remains, at this 
Asian products 
California will 
Driving forces towards economic integration include, of 
course, lower labor costs and preferential access to California 
markets. The risk of protectionist U.S. public sentiment, 
including environmental considerations, may partly motivate 
cross-border cooperation with California. 
It's obvious that the implications for California of Federal 
initiatives toward trade liberalization throughout the Western 
hemisphere need also to be examined. Conversely, in the face of 
declining defense spending and a recessionary u.s. economy, 
tremendous economic potential for growing Pacific export markets 
merits our presence here and our further attention. 
By the year 2000, as Japan and the Four Tigers (Taiwan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) evolve into more mature and 
consumer driven economies, these markets will provide 13 million 
net in new consumers for California exports as well. Newly 
emerging countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines will provide about 68 million, with China, of course, 
providing well over 100 million. 
Access to these Pacific Rim markets 
adroit strategic alliances among California 
Rim Counterparts. In this context I believe 
a paramount need to: 
requires, I believe, 
entities and Pacific 
that California faces 
1. Enhance foreign language and cultural literacy; 
2. Enhance technological learning; 
3. Enhance international business competence of our own 
human resources here in this State. 
Focused collaboration and information networking among 
industry, academic and government sectors is going to be 
increasingly vital. The unique strengths that we have in terms of 
our geography, our technology and ethnic diversity here in this 
State present, I believe, a significant opportunity for California 
to lead as a principal hub for business, technology and cultural 
exchange among Asian, Soviet, Latin American, European and u.s. 
interests throughout the Pacific Rim. 
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Today's hearing, I hope, will reflect the Legislature's 
commitment to exercise California's leadership in promoting 
cooperation and growth within the Pacific Rim, and I appreciate 
very much the attendance of all of you at this symposium which 
we're calling a hearing. 
To my left is Mr. Terrence Barber, who is Principal 
Consultant to the Committee and who is responsible for putting 
together our agenda today. 
II. PACIFIC RIM INTEGRATION 
A. cross-Border Private/Public Collaboration in the Pacific Rim 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is Dr. Choate here yet? 
right in front. Welcome to the Committee. 
ALLEN C. CHOATE: Thank you. 
Ah, you walked 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Allen c. Choate is Executive Vice 
President of the Asia Foundation, formerly Executive Director, 
Center for Asian Pacific Affairs, housing the U.S. National 
Commitee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, the PECC. 
DR. CHOATE: Thank you very much. I'm a little breathless. 
You'll have to excuse my late arrival, I'm afraid the San Diego 
Airport was fogged in this morning, so we were an hour and a half 
late getting in. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I drove in last night, I understand. 
DR. CHOATE: Thank you very much for the opportunity to lead 
off this morning. I will limit my remarks to about ten minutes or 
so, especially since I see Professor Krause sitting over there and 
you can't have a better specialist on this topic than he to 
address this. 
I would just like to try and provide some very quick answers 
to about five basic questions. First, what is the concept of 
Pacific Economic Cooperation?. Second, what are its origins? 
What's the current status of this alphabet soup of acronymns, 
PBEC, PEC, APEC, etc ..... ? How are they perceived and what about 
their future? Finally, just a couple of remarks I hope will be 
useful concerning California connections and California roles. 
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The concept of Pacific Economic Cooperation is basically an 
idea which fosters and promotes open and market oriented economies 
primarily through the promotion fo freer Pacific Rim trade, but 
also by encouraging structural economic reforms in liberalization. 
It has been consistently on the record, that APEC and PEC 
personify those ideas pro-GATT (not a trade block operation), in 
support of various liberalization proposals that have been 
considered in the current Uruguay Round. 
One particular characteristic of this specific economic 
cooperation movement that makes it different from the European 
efforts of some decades ago is that, wpereas in Europe the OECD 
represented a political initiative which led to economic policy 
cooperation and cooperative institutions, the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation concept is primarily market-driven. It is driven by 
market economic forces. What we have in the APEC phenomenon, I 
think you could characterize as an effort by governments to 
somewhat recognize what is going on in the private sector and come 
to terms with them. 
What are the origins of PEC, APEC, PBEC and these other 
acronyms which are concerned with economic cooperation? It should 
be noted that the idea was first spawned in the late 1960's and 
is, with hindsight, now viewed as a somewhat unrealistic perhaps 
romantic idea of a Pacific Economic community, not unlike the EEC. 
Those first efforts were, as I indicated, found quickly to be 
unrealistic for a variety of reasons and then, after a not too 
lengthy hiatus, more organizations were formed to address the 
economic trends that were underway in Asia. The first of these 
was PFTAD, here's a new acronym, although an older organization 
perhaps the first in this group. PFTAD stands for the Pacific 
Free Trade and Development Conference. It is an association of 
economists and academics investigating regional economic trends. 
PBEC, on the other hand, the Pacific Basin Economic council is an 
association of businessmen also established in the late 60's to 
represent private business interests in those regional trends. 
And, both PBEC and PFTAD today have institutional membership in 
PECC, the PECC. 
If I'm talking too fast and if you're not familiar with all 
of this, we can go back over that later if you like. The PECC 
itself, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, was formed as 
a result of the first meeting Canherra, Australia in 1980. It was 
deliberately formed as a network of national committees, each 
tripartite in composition (business, government and academic 
elements) . The purpose was to fashion constructive policy 
recommendations concerning regional trade and investment and what 
had become all too clear by 1980 as the vital lively and growing 
inter-regional trade in the Asian Pacific region. 
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Finally, APEC itself is an inter-governmental initiative, an 
official initiative, a series of meetings rather than an 
organization which first met in canberra in 1989, and in Singapore 
just this past July. It will meet again in Seoul in 1991, in 
Bangkok in 1992 and then in the United States, at a site to be 
determined, in 1993. These meetings are intended to provide an 
'informal dialogue for officials to discuss trade and economic 
issues. It may have been mentioned that at the first meeting in 
Canberra, Secretary Baker, Ambassador Hills, and Secretary 
Mosbacher all attended. 
Now, what is the current status of PECC and APEC, in 
particular, since these are the leading organizations? They've 
both developed work programs which to a large extent mirror one 
another's agendas. These agendas include trade and investment 
data review, trade promotion, investment expansion and technology 
transfer, multilateral human resource development initiatives 
(which had been particularly pushed, I think by the ASEAN 
countries), energy cooperation, marine resource conservation and 
telecommunications. 
APEC and PECC are in the process of working out a cooperative 
and collaborative set of relationships. PECC is an official 
observer at all APEC meetings now. The specific economic outlook 
about which Professor Krause can certainly talk, since he's the 
coordinator of that project, serves as a reference for the 
official trade and investment review conducted by the ministers. 
The PECC Fisheries Taskforce, for example, coordinates closely 
with the APEC work group in this area and so on. 
Just to delineate membership, PECC at the present time is 
larger than APEC. APEC consists of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
Canada, Korea, the United States and all of the ASEAN countries. 
PECC has 15 member economies with--as you mentioned--Mexico, 
, Peru, Hong Kong, and the Soviet Union all applicants. It 
anticipated that at the next general meeting of PECC, which 
11 be in Singapore in May, at least Mexico, Hong Kong, perhaps 
le, perhaps even Peru will be admitted to formal membership. 
How are they perceived? I'm watching the time here. I don't 
to consume too much. It must be remembered that neither of 
these groups at the present time are formal organizations or 
institutions as we normally understand that, with an 
infrastructure and support staff. 
The PECC has within the past year or so established a small 
relatively modest permanent secretariat in Singapore. Each of the 
member committees has an institution or a free-standing small 
group of staff which serve as the national secretariat for each 
member committee. 
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So, PECC views itself as process more than an institution and 
APEC even more modest than that, just views itself as a series of 
non-formal meetings among officials. 
There are three views of these movements that can be 
identified. First, those who view the whole APEC/PECC as an idea 
whose time has come. I think you will find that this idea is most 
commonly held by specialists and economists and observers of the 
economic trends in the region who can see quite clearly that the 
pace and volume of trade investment and other economic activity is 
increasing and, therefore, that the idea of forming some new ways 
of addressing economic cooperation is a logical consequence to 
follow that trend. 
Second, those who view APEC and PECC, and the idea and the 
process behind it, as an idea whose time has not yet come but may 
in the not too distant future. I think that you'd find that that 
idea is held largely by businessmen who want to know where the 
payoff in all of this is. Where's the beef? When you have a 
group of individuals and associations and organizations who are 
meeting to talk policy and make recommendations for businessmen 
interested in bottom lines, they want to know what that bottom 
line is going to be. They want to see evidence of direct input 
into policy conclusions that will facilitate their trade. All of 
these are somewhat oversimplified, of course, but I think there 
are trends they'll be able to identify. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In 1990--the meeting you mentioned in July 
1990, there were seven work projects identified. 
DR. CHOATE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Are those the kinds of bottom lines the 
bus sector is looking for from your perspective? 
DR. CHOATE: Well, I think there are two kinds of bottom 
1 one policy, one very much applied. The policy one would 
be... example, I was noticing in the newpaper the other day 
that iland has been recognized or, if that's the word, cited as 
the primary offender of intellectual property rights globally by a 
variety of international associations. The attempts to deal with 
that on a policy and regulatory format are of direct interest to, 
for example, software producers who don't want to see their 
products go to thailand because they'll be ripped off. In 
addition to sanctions and punitive measures, there are some 
positive policy steps and regulatory steps that can be taken and 
I'd suggest that in bodies like APEC and PECC they stand a better 
chance than in formal, official, bilateral negotiations. 
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The second example is an applied one. If the work programs 
of APEC and PECC have to do, for example, with infrastructure 
development; again, I'll use Thailand as a case in point. 
Thailand is a booming economy but one whose infrastructure in 
telecommunications, roads, etc., is running way behind its 
capacity to absorb foreign investment. There's a lot of 
opportunity for contract work should the Government of Thailand 
make the commitments necessary to improve its infrastructure and I 
think those commitments are probably forthcoming. The 
encouragement of what would be viewed as activity in everybody's 
interest, the development of new telecommunications systems, 
roads, ports, etc.( in this case I'm using Thailand as an example) 
produces more business, simply stated, and that would be the other 
payoff businessmen would like to see, if that answers your 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What were the seven projects identified? 
DR. CHOATE: I quickly ran through those work programs 
eerlier, trade and investment, trade promotion, investment 
expansion, technology transfer, human resource development, energy 
cooperation, marine resource conservation, telecommunications 
that's APEC's work progrm. The PECC Task force is ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, but which of those projects could 
California interface with from your perspective, most adroitly, as 
opposed to another? 
DR. CHOATE: Well, I guess I would focus on 
telecommunications first. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Why do you choose that? 
DR. CHOATE: Because of California's comparative advantage in 
high tech development, and the locations of the number of 
corporations in this area that have services and products to 
deliver. There are others in science and technology, Hewlett 
Packard, for example, is avery active in the PECC science and 
Technology Taskforce, and I would assume that they see potential 
developments that would be conducive to their own business 
interests in that area. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In APEC, Canada is handling the 
environment. In what way do you see California participating in 
that relationship? 
DR. CHOATE: I'm sorry, in which ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In APEC, Canada 
issues through that organization as 
California interface with that? 
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is handling environmental 
I understand. How can 
DR. CHOATE: Well, the environment, as I underGtand it, is 
focused primarily on fisheries and marine resources and it is true 
that Canada is the lead group taking the initiative on that. But 
once again the resources that APEC has available to it are the 
resources of PECC and any other entity, any other group within any 
of the participating nations that seeks to be assertive in 
promoting policies and in making recommendations. In other words, 
the APEC does not have an in-house capability for conducting the 
inventories and for developing the policy recommendations 
necessary other than through their own Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs. In the case of the United 
States, I believe that APEC looks to a number of outside 
organizations, PECC primarily, but to a variety of policy 
institutions as well as the business sector for soliciting ideas 
and recommendations on how to deal with some of these issues. The 
u.s. National Committee of PECC of, I guess it 
has developed, an APEC advisory program which would allow sectoral 
business interests to ban together to make inputs into the APEC 
process, to arrive at policy conclusions, creating the conditions 
that would be more conducive for enhanced business. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In terms of APEC's relationship to our 
Federal Government in terms of higher education or education as a 
whole, do you envision a role for the PECC in that relationship as 
well? 
DR. CHOATE: You're referring primarily domestically to the 
improvement of educational needs in the u.s. system? Quite 
frankly, I honestly don't. I may have a narrow vision on this but 
I think that the PECC mandate is primarily one that is concerned 
with foreign relations, if you will. There is ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: With all of these organizations that are 
, how does APEC interface with its initiative for 
education with how you see it perhaps? 
DR. CHOATE: My understanding of the APEC initiative on human 
resource development is that that initiative was generated 
primari by the Southeast Asian countries and I think that they 
are looking primarily at the need for certain kinds of labor and 
also at problems which go beyond just education. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So it's more vocationally oriented? 
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DR. CHOATE: Could be, but it also deals with questions of 
migration, workforce unemployment, under-employment, questions of 
that sort. I keep on referring back to Thailand because it's the 
country I know best at the moment, but there is a question of a 
rapidly developing economy which is short of that middle 
level--the foreman level, technician level--in its workforce, 
whereas in Singapore there simply aren't enough people to go 
around. They have to import labor. As I understand it, the focus 
of this initiative is more the question of labor flows, labor 
force than it is on education at the present time although it's 
fairly comprehensive. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, the President has indicated he's 
going to fund APEC's initiative by ten million dollars for this 
project over five years with an additional twenty million planned 
from the private sector and other sources. 
DR. CHOATE: 
development? 
The APEC initiative in human resource 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Right, right. 
DR. CHOATE: Well, then I'm not aware of the details on that 
particular initiative. I knew that it had come from the Southeast 
Asian countries. I'm not sure whether the financial resources 
pledged by the United States will be going toward the development 
of southeast Asian educational program or survey. I'm simply not 
familiar with that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
DR. CHOATE: That would be my assumption. 
necessarily mean I agree with that idea. 
That doesn't 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Of course, but that's not unique today. We 
have many Republican Congressional candidates not agreeing with 
their President. 
DR. CHOATE: Let me just make a couple of closing comments 
before taking up too much more time. I'd mentioned two views of 
APEC. The third one is that it is a risky idea whose time may 
never come; and that idea is one that you hear privately by 
representatives of certain governments, especially in Southeast 
Asia who feel that in order for this kind of mechanism to be 
successful, they'll have to cede some of their control. I won't 
say their sovereignty, that's a little too dramatic, but that they 
would not have the flexibility and room for maneuver that they've 
had in the past. Now, what about the future? 
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First of all, APEC and PECC have their momentum generated at 
the present time. Just carrying out their schedule will take them 
through the next two years. The importance of these two groups, 
APEC and PECC will be determined by the need to manage regional 
economic interdependence and that need, I'd suggest may become 
more critical in a period of economic slowdown, as we're all aware 
this is a part of the world which has experienced nothing but 
growth and rapid performance year after year. If that should slow 
down to any significant degree, one could speculate that the need 
for some coordinating mechanisms for coming to terms with some of 
the need to manage,--I wouldn't call them dwindling resources--but 
less available resources might become more important. 
Secondly, despite APEC and PECC claims, and they're sincere 
claims, that they are not in anyway directed toward the formation 
of trade block, there are those who would wink and say, this does 
provide insurance in the event of a collapse of the Uruguay Round 
or less than successful of the Uruguay Round. Then countries will 
have to look at other mechanisms, other ways to establish 
functioning trade regimes. This could be one potential way for 
that. 
And, finally, of course, the idea of Europe '92. Once again, 
this is an insurance policy drawn by the countries of the Asia 
Pacific region--if they are locked out--they have their own 
economies to fall back on and interact with. What's the 
California connection and interest? Let me make one announcement 
here, the next general meeting of the PECC will be in Singapore, 
as I indicated in May of '92. Following that in the fall of '93 
will be the next general meeting. These are held roughly every 
year and a half or so. That meeting will be held in the United 
States and it's been determined that it will be held in San 
Francisco in California. That has the endorsement of the Governor 
of California. We would also like to have, at that time, if at 
all ible; a major meeting of APEC to be held more or less 
simultaneously with that significant meeting. It would--it could 
possibly by that all of these that I mentioned about the 
significance of APEC could come to a head about that time. 
The California connection, as I mentioned Professor Krause is 
sitting over here. The Pacific Economic outlook ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Waiting patiently to •.. 
DR. CHOATE: And I've gone on too long. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: No, no, no. 
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DR. CHOATE: I have brought some materials here including 
several copies of the Pacific Economic Outlook which is a forecast 
that Professor Krause can talk about. He serves as the 
coordinator for that project which involves 15 countries. A 
California corporation, the Inter Pacific Group has partially 
funded that and my organization, the Asia Foundation also supports 
it and serves as the West Coast Office for the u.s. Committee of 
PECC. 
Of the 90 members of the u.s. National Committee for Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, 25 are from California, that's by far the 
largest number from any single state. The opportunity for 
California to have its concerns and interest represented on the 
U.S. National Committee and therefore in the International Floor 
of the PECC are significant. The California interests are able to 
raise issues that are of priority concern to them at anytime 
through the membership of the U. s. National Committee, the 
California membership, and again, I have some lists of all of the 
Committee members indicating those--obviously those from 
California as well. 
I mentioned earlier the APEC Advisory program is a new effort 
by the U.S. National Committee to make sure that sectoral business 
interests in the United States have an opportunity to register 
their concerns, raise questions and have them carried through with 
the official fora of APEC, and more information on that will 
become available as this program gels. But I would suggest that 
more active involvement in the U.S. National Committee by those 
that are already members of the u.s. National Committee from 
California is one means for furthering California interest and 
participation in the APEC Business Advisory Program would be a 
second, and I'll stop at that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Give my best to Bill. 
DR. CHOATE: I will. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
DR. CHOATE: He says hello. 
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B. strategic Linkage Formation - Leadership o~portunities 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Sergeants, we're going to have to move the 
witness table over here, otherwise I'll need a chiropractor by the 
end of the day. Maybe we need to move chairs over further. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: The , Professor Krause, will 
encourage more dialogue and informal conversation. Welcome to the 
Committee. Professor Lawrence Krause, Coordinator of the PECC 
Forecasting Panel, distinguished by other credentials as well. 
Welcome to the Committee. 
PROFESSOR 
Chairman. I 
interrupt you? 
LAWRENCE KRAUSE: Thank you 
wish to thank the Committee--do 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: No! 
very much, Mr. 
you have--did I 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: I wish to thank the Committee for g1v1ng 
me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss some 
ideas that are very close to my heart. For over twenty years, 
I've been a close observer of growing economic interdependence in 
Pacific Rim, and have directed my research to understanding and 
promoting this very important economic phenomenon. 
Now today, I want to discuss five things with you. The 
nature of economic integration in the Pacific -- all briefly I 
should say -- secondly, the challenge of Europe to the Pacific. 
Thirdly, to pose the question, "What is the United States, now 
that the Cold War is over, and the new European home is being 
created". Fourthly, the nature of institutional development in the 
Pacif And finally, what is the role fo California in this?. 
Not without some irony, the end of the Cold War has suddenly 
the importance of regionalism in the Pacific. What 
exists is a Pacific Basin--in the Pacific Basin is a 
process that's leading to very close economic relations--a process 
has significant force and momentum behind them. I am 
conscious of the fact that I have sent this testimony to you so I 
am going to go through this very quickly and try to avoid 
duplicating what Allen Choate has already said. It is important 
to understand that the countries in the Pacific have consistently 
and universally denied that they wish to form a common market. 
That is, a principle of Pacific integration is no discrimination 
against the outside. That is an important principle, but it's 
interesting nevertheless to compare the Pacific Rim with what has 
happened in the European community. Because, in one respect, they 
are similar in that they have a common goal to promote 
international trade and merchandise. 
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I've provided a table to you, and I'm not going to go through 
all the numbers, but I want to point out the message of that 
table. And that is, if you look at the last twenty years, the 
Pacific economies are more dynamic, both in the growth of output, 
their growth of international trade and the degree to which 
they've become integrated. In other words, the Pacific countries 
trade about 66% of all their trade with each other. The European 
countries trade about 56% - 58% with each other. Now, it's only 
the Europeans that discriminate; so theirs is, in a sense, forced. 
In the Pacific, that is a natural consequence of economic forces, 
and I'm suggesting that these data suggest that the Pacific is a 
more natural economic unit than is Europe. 
However, the Cold War--the end of the Cold War has created a 
lot of changes, including the reunification of Germany, the 
marketization of Eastern Europe, the decentralization and possible 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and all of these changes are 
identifying the United states because they are shaping the global 
environment. One of the most important implications of these 
developments, along with Europe 1992, is that a larger, stronger 
and more unified Europe is being created and the announcement that 
a currency decision has been made with all countries with the U.K. 
aside, have agreed to form a common currency. That's quite a 
significant development when you give up your national currency. 
European regional a reality and it is incompatible with 
a concept of a global economy. Within Europe there is a 
difference between treatment--in treatment--between those who 
belong and those that do not. The totality of Europe is simply 
too large to be one element in a global economy in which there are 
no other groupings of comparable size. 
Other countries will f they will need countervailing power 
to the challenge on an enlarged Europe. The challenge could 
one of indifference--that is, Europe is so preoccupied with 
internal issues that they will have no interest in nor care about 
the of the world. And getting Europe's attention will be 
diffcult to even complete the Uruguay round, after that it will be 
next to impossible. And the second challenge, of course, will be 
discrimination. Well, that takes me to the question of "What is 
the u.s. now that the Cold War has ended and Europe has created a 
larger home." The United States is an ever-changing country 
because Americans are so mobile, and significant numbers of 
immigrants are still coming to our shores. 
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The origin of the new residents of the United States are also 
changing. They are increasingly coming from Asia and Mexico; 
hence the u.s. and especially California, is becoming more Asian 
and more Mexican. It should also be noted that it is the first 
generation of immigrants whose previous national ties are most 
important. 
Furthermore, the last two wars of the United States were in 
Asia, so even security is no longer dominated by Europe. However, 
what is most important is that Europeans clearly do not consider 
the United States to be part of the new European home. There is 
absolutely no inclination in Europe to give special consideration 
to the United States when economic issues are at stake. Hence, I 
believe that from an economic perspective, and economics is going 
to be of growing importance in international relations, the United 
States is a Pacific country wherein from an economic point of 
view, we are just as much a Pacific country as Germany is a 
European country. 
Economic forces are propelling the United States into closer 
integration with the Pacific Rim. If Mexico should become 
identified with the Pacific, which entirely possible, that's 
intriguing, now that even greater momentum will build in the same 
direction. 
Well, if that is all if you take that as a working 
premise, then the question has to be asked, "Need the Pacific 
Basin develop more institutional structure?" Allen has described 
where we are at present. I think there are several reasons why 
more institutional structure will be needed. The necessity for 
effective national economic policymaking will force us to more 
institutions; the needed amelioration of economic disputes and 
conflicts might well require more institutions; and finally the 
opportunities for creating joint action. 
Now, with respect to Europe, it will be disputes with Europe. 
They may well force a United Pacific response, and indeed a united 
response will be the only way to mount countervailing pressure 
without starting a mutually destructive economic conflict. 
Clearly, some institutional structure will be very useful in 
building a consensus of views in the Pacific, and in arranging the 
modalities of negotiation. 
I want to reinforce what Allen said about the process of 
integration in the Pacific being the reverse of the European 
community. European community starts with politics, goes through 
national law-making and then gets to the economic result. In the 
Pacific you start with economic forces, forcing integration --
everyone sort of becomes aware of it and then the institutions are 
created at the end of the day that are necessary to help this 
process along and make it improve the economic welfare. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: Given the nature of the u.s. society, 
how .•. what recommendations would you have for our integration with 
that type of .•• 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Well, my view is that the forms of 
integration are fallout of the analysis, that what is lacking is 
the understanding of what is going on. It is not a problem so 
much in California as it is a problem on the East Coast of the 
United States where, I think, history, tradition and their 
viewpoint get them to think about Europe as our primary partner 
when, in fact, the Pacific is much larger and much more important. 
It's interesting ... the excitement being created by the 
opening of Eastern Europe. Well, the total population of Eastern 
Europe is less than Mexico, and Mexico has a lot more promise in 
the short and probably the long-run than Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless if you talk about the impending possibility of 
U.S./Mexican free trade, that gets very little recognition within 
the Beltway, but a lot of attention to Eastern European history 
and culture. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I was in Caracas meeting with President 
Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela at the time when The Wall was 
coming down, in Berlin. And there was such disappointment in 
Latin American because from there I travelled to Central 
America as well, as part of a Federal Commission I had served on, 
to look for the economic push factors for the region that have an 
impact on migration -- and the underlying concern was that the 
only hope that we had had, for the Western Hemisphere to be looked 
at again in cooperation with the u.s. policy for economic 
incentives, had been totally lost by the romantic notion of moving 
back to Europe and rebuilding a society that was not as high a 
prior -- should not be viewed as being as high a priority -- as 
the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific region. Given that, that 
Eastern mentality in terms of where people are at in their 
perceptions, do you env1s1on a regional split within the u.s. 
economic and political regions to take advantage and what role can 
California play in that? 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Well, forecasting the future of political 
developments is a treacherous ground, but since that's -- I'm an 
economic forecaster, I tend to fall into that swamp of trying to 
do it. My judgment is that there will be an explicit rebuff to 
the United States by Europe. It may come as early as the end of 
the Uruguay Round -- or attempted end of the Uruguay round, or it 
may come subsequently as Europeans start to look differently at 
Eastern Europe and then the u.s. They will -- and they will look 
in a proprietary way towards Eastern Europe. When that split 
comes, then there will be concerns in the u.s. -- how do we react? 
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And then it'll be a choice between the three-region world and 
the two-region world. 
The three-region world is this sort of Europe, Western 
Hemisphere and Western Pacific. That perspective is again, an 
East Coast perspective because it views things as this Western 
Hemisphere entirely from the U.S. perspective; and doesn't 
recognize the dangers of the politics of a Western Hemisphere 
union in which the u.s. will be distrusted by the other countries 
in the region and the u.s. will be feared as dominating them. And 
it also fails to recognize that the Western Pacific is exactly in 
the same relationship -- the smaller countries -- with respect to 
Japan. Therefore, if you go to Southeast Asia, they are 
tremendously anxious to have the u.s. as a counterweight in Japan; 
and that's obviously true in Latin as well, they want Japan as a 
counterweight to the u.s. So, the two-region model makes more 
political and economic sense for the non-European countries. But 
a two-region model also has more elements of stability in the 
relationship bewteen two regions. 
To be a theorist for a moment, gain theory tells you 
two-person models are stable because you have repetitive gains of 
the same kind. Three-person gains can be very unstable because of 
shifting coalitions and that can be a significant loss--could lead 
to a significant loss in world welfare. I'm sorry for this long 
digression. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: No! So where do you place the Soviets, 
given the agreements in Madrid and agreement yesterday in Paris? 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: The Soviet Union--it may not be 
dismembered, but it is certainly going to be decentralized. And 
most of the Soviet Union is Europe-oriented, particularly Russia, 
despite Siberia being part of the Russian Republic -- it is 
Europe-oriented -- it's dominated by Europe. My view is that in 
the main, the Europe Soviet Union will be a European country. In 
terms of the Pacific integration, it's only if Siberia becomes an 
independent republic that you will see even part of the Soviet 
Union being Pacific-oriented. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, with Vladivostok opening •.• 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: It was in 1984 that Gorbachev promised 
that Vladivostok would be opened. It really hasn't been yet; and 
even if they should open it, over the objection of the Soviet 
military, I think you will find that the resources to develop it 
won't come from within the Soviet Union. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: They'll come from Japan. 
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PROFESSOR KRAUSE: So you have to ask the question, "Is 
there an economic and political reason for the Pacific countries 
to help develop that part of the Soviet Union. And I think there 
will be cooperation, but we're talking minimum. I mean, as 
compared to say Thailand, that's been mentioned frequently, it's 
integration with the Soviet Union that's complete. The 
Siberian part of the soviet Union is trivial in comparison. 
Well, I think there may be some forces that will be speeding 
up institutional strengthening and they've already been 
mentioned by Allen -- that's a possibility of a failure at the 
Uruguay Round. The Europe in 1992 and, in fact, the worldwide 
recession which might well force us to look at things in a more 
integrated manner. 
Now the State of ifornia has a strong and direct interest 
in these institutional developments. First of all, the process of 
economic integration within Pacific is felt in California to a 
much greater degree than most other states. Hewlett Packard's 
been mentioned. We could mention a number of companies. American 
business firms that have extensive operation in the Pacific Rim 
have significant presence in California. Furthermore, many 
foreign firms, coming from other countries in the Pacific Rim, 
have major operations in California. It goes both ways. And of 
course the people of Cal have close cultural and societal 
links to Pacific Rim countries. 
How are these interests of California to be represented in 
the institutions of the Pacific? Clearly as an integral part of 
the U.S. effort, therefore Californians and the government of the 
State of California should become involved to a further degree and 
make significant efforts to support those institutions that 
represent the United States. 
I believe an institution such as the u.s. National Committee 
Pacific Economic Cooperation would welcome the participation 
of California as an entity. 
California will have to make the case that it is more 
involved in the Pacific Rim than other states, but I think it can 
be established. To demonstrate its interests, the State of 
California should be prepared to provide financial and human 
resources to support the work of the U.S. National Committee. 
Without financial support the Committee will be unable to 
represent the U.S. and Californian interests properly. My own 
involvement is part of the commitment, but more is needed. 
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Well, when we're talking about the real and ~he political 
importance of all this, what difference does the Pacific Rim make, 
I mean in terms of the bottom-line, for private business sector 
within the region and within the State of California? It affects 
them directly because of the growth of markets. Secondly, for the 
countries in Latin America that we're closely aligned with, and 
expecially Mexico, it suggests that the successful role model for 
development are to be found in the Pacific. That is the model 
that Salinas is now following. One shouldn't think of his model 
of growth as the United States. It's really not that. It's 
really more the developing countries in the Pacific. Third, the 
development of the Pacific Rim, and its institutions, should warn 
the European community that it can not be cavalier about their 
economic relations with non-member countries. Fourthly, the 
governments in the Pacific Rim must be aware that opportunities 
are created for closer economic inteegration but also that the 
disputes are coming and we need some institutions to help moderate 
it. 
California should be aware that dispute management, down in 
Washington, D.C. may not be reflective of the State's interest. 
Therefore we must be very close to this process. Finally, closer 
economic integration does provide the presumption that some 
welfare-promoting institutional strengthening is possible. If the 
opportunity or the necessity should present itself, then 
government should welcome rather than resist it. The State of 
California can make an important contribution to this desired end. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. How does one begin to 
impact those decisions that are made in Washington and regionalize 
them more from your perspective? 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Well, in my view when you have an issue such as 
relationship with Japan, and when it's treated with small 
politics, that is a congressman whose district maybe being 
impacted by imports, indeed someone running for the Congress or 
even a Senator or conceivably even a Presidential candidate--when 
they try to make a case for Japan-bashing--and I'm not an 
apologist for Japan--but when they do that, they are ignoring the 
interests of the State of California. And I believe that it's an 
educational effort that needs to be promoted because when it's 
countered solely by the registered representatives of Japan, then 
it quite rightly is disregarded. Whereas, a statement written by 
an unbiased expert goes 90% further than any of these biased 
statements. 
There is no reason why California should be disadvantaged 
because of the small politics of Japan-bashing or Korea-bashing or 
whatever it is. And while it's proven to be not a very promising 
political avenue, I think more and more times we are likely to try 
to do it. 
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So we have an educational effort involved and disputes arise all 
the time. They can be followed and Californians interests can be 
made known. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 400,000 Vietnamese are living in California 
today, many of whom are U.S. izens; what should California's 
role be with Viet Nam once economic sanctions are lifted? 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Well, I have no expertise with respect to 
Vietnam. I am aware that this isn't a self-selected group who 
can•t ... and we may face this significant problem of that group of 
citizens having a particular view towards Vietnam. It may be even 
a disputed view. There may be differences of views. I suspect 
that ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Um hum. There are. 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: ... we need to utilize that expertise but 
have a judgment that that's sort of not determined by the national 
group. We are in the process of trying to sort out our problems 
with Viet Nam, and I think in not the very distant future, we will 
have normalized relationships with thim. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: AND THE PRC? 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Well, PRC is much more advanced, of 
course, and the PRC is trying to do something that is impossible. 
That is to liberalize their economy and open it up and become more 
integrated with the rest of the Pacific, while at the same time 
maintaining a closed political system. I think that is 
incompatible. I think it will fall of it's own weight, and it may 
take this particular aged generation to give up power before it 
happens. But I think it is to California's interest to maintain 
to strengthen economic ties with the PRC. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, the politics are these but everyone 
knows that the mercantile families in Taiwan and Hong Kong are 
still doing substantial business within the main. 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Increased. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: An increased business within the mainland, 
and the Taiwanese population in California is increasing. 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: I think it is a major interacting market 
with California. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. Thank you very much. 
PROFESSOR KRAUSE: Thank you. 
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c. Japan, Latin America, and the Free Trade Movemen,;: 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Professor Peter Smith, Co-chairman of the 
Bilateral Commission on the Future of u.s. and Mexican Relations. 
Welcome to the Committee. 
PROFESSOR PETER SMITH: Thank you very much. I appreciate 
the opportunity to be here today. I'll try to stick within the 14 
minute time limit. As you know academics are notorious for having 
15 minute cycles of speech. I'll do my best to respect your time, 
Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, we've allowed for fudge factors. 
PROFESSOR SMITH: The question in a sense I want to address 
is, "Who could ever be against free-trade?" It sounds like an 
unquestionable good for all concerned. A bit like motherhood and 
apple pie. Who might oppose it and why and what are some of the 
politics of the free trade movement that might affect the Pacific 
Rim and Latin America? The problem, in a sense, is that 
free-trade for members within a region seems to imply a relative 
advantage over non-members who are not from the region. So a 
question to ask about a free-trade movement is, "How does it look 
to non-members?" Specifically, I'd like to address the question of 
what seems to be the Japanese perspective on the free-trade 
movement in Latin America and what implications does that 
perspective have for integration of the Pacific Rim. 
By the free-trade movement in this presentation I refer to 
two phenomena. First, the bilateral U.S.fMexico free-trade 
discussions as initially promoted by President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortade of Mexico; and second, the possibility of the prospect of 
hemisphere wide U.S.fLatin America free-trade as proclaimed by 
President Bush in his speech of late June, this year. My comments 
are based on years of scholarship and observation of the 
U.S.fMexico relationship, and all of four months of observation of 
Japan through a recent fellowship of the Japan Society of New 
York. So, undaunted by grasp or knowledge of the fact, I will 
proceed to offer testimony on the basis of these experiences. 
First, the U.S.fMexico discussions. My view is that it all 
depends on thee fine print. My specific to you is that bilateral 
free-trade discussions between the u.s. and Mexico are not so much 
about trade. That much of that has already been accomplished in 
recent years. But they really focus on investment, which is what 
Mexico wants, and competitiveness, which is what the u.s. wants 
from access to low-cost Mexican labor. Most specifically, with 
regard to the U.S.fMexico discussions, I think there were three 
basic issues which have implications for California. 
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First, the scope of the Will it cover petroleum 
as well as agriculture? Will cover migration and if so, how, 
as well as investment? Second, the timing of the agreement; 
President Salinas wants an accord quickly. It's important to 
notice that his power 11 to evaporate in 1992. His 
mandate, or term, goes until 1994, but the politics are, that if 
he is going to get an agreement through, he really needs to do it 
within the next year-and-a-half. Third, the issue of the uses of 
the agreement. Will it become a lever for thee United states 
throughthese negotiations to put pressure on Mexico, either for 
accelerated political reform within Mexico, or for intensified 
prosecution of anti-drug wars. are two of the issues widely 
discussed in the news--more discussed in Mexico than in 
this country. I am not an economist. I suspect that the 
California economy would have much to gain from a reasonable, 
thoughtful, careful U.S.fMexico bilateral free-trade accord. But 
I am quite certain that California would have the most to lose 
from a poorly drawn, hastily designed, highly politicized accord. 
For example, if anti-drug measures were to become part of the 
pressure the U.S. would use in dealing with Mexico in free-trade, 
the implementation of that anti-drug measure would come at the 
california border and it would have reverberations throughout the 
state. 
If migration of short-term recovery in 
Mexico, as most analysts ... that , the trade-off usually 
discussed in the media is, "you can either have our products or 
our people from Mexico." The fact is most analysts think in the 
short-run you would get more products and more people; that in the 
long-run, you might get products and fewer people. But, if the 
free-trade accord promotes that and most people come to California 
as is increasingly the case, then would there be any provision, 
either in California law or in this free-trade accord, for how to 
handle this increased impetus toward migration. 
If haste in an agreement leads to disregard of adequate 
environmental concerns, my guess is that California will lose a 
disproportionate share of investments because of the type of 
environmental laws in this State compared to neighboring states, 
and it would also rece a disproportionate share of the 
cross-border pollution. 
In general, my feeling is that a possible atmosphere of 
recrimination and discrimination resulting from failed aspirations 
and betrayed hopes resulting from a poorly drawn free-trade 
accord, would become most volatile here in California. 
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Indeed jobs would probably be lost. Some jobs would probably 
go to Mexico as a result of a free-trade accord. The question, in 
a sense, is whether it isn't better to lose jobs to Mexico than to 
Asia--at least we get something back when jobs go to Mexico. 
About 15% or 20% of added income to Mexico as some economists 
indicate, comes back to the U.S. So for every seven or eight jobs 
we lose, we get at least one back, if you can believe those 
figures. 
I think the ultimate question is, how important is it for 
California to have a sustained recovery of the Mexican 7conomy. 
or, to put it another way, as we face a possible recess1on, can 
California really afford continued and prolong depression of the 
Mexican economy. That seems to me to be the question at the 
source of issues that Professor Johnson and others have raised as 
important for analysis of California's future. 
Now, the Japanese outlook, as I understood it in my four 
months of observations and interviews, the Japanese are rather 
skeptical about Latin America. They recognize cultural ties. 
They are fascinated by the history and diversity of Latin American 
culture. Japanese citizens showed considerable enthusiasm for 
Alberto Fujimori of Peru, when he made a visit early in July 
shortly after his election to the presidency. But my feeling is, 
on the basis of 60 interviews with leading Japanese politicians, 
investors and bureaucrats, that they're really not very interested 
in using Latin America as a beachhead for infiltration into the 
u.s. or for creating a kind of alternative power base. 
There are, to be sure, at least three major economic 
interests that the Japanese have in Latin America. One is access 
to raw materials, especially food stuffs largely from Brazil, and 
ewnergy, especially petroleum from Mexico and Venezuela, and coal 
from Colombia. Second, somewhat surprising to non-specialists, is 
the importance of the Panama Canal through which a large share of 
Japanese trade passes, not only to or from Latin America, but also 
the East Coast of the United States and some European trade as 
well. So they had a very special stake in Panama. They were very 
close to Noriega until we told them to change their direction; and 
indeed they followed the events of last December with great 
interest. Thirdly, of course, they do see Latin America as a 
potential export platform to the u.s., that is, a legitimate open 
back door to the u.s. market. And this is one of the key 
implications of a potential free-trade agreement--either with 
Mexico or with Latin America as a whole. 
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I might say parenthetically that most diplomats and 
bureaucrats in Tokyo give passing reference to the importance of a 
potential market, consumer market in Latin America, as another 
business opportunity. But when push comes to shove, it isn't that 
important to them. They're rather skeptical about the durability 
and the power of the Latin American market, and when they compare 
it to what they see as historic opportunities in a place like 
China, it simply doesn't compare. So they will tell you that the 
market is important, and in a way that's one of their major goals; 
but my feeling, at least on the basis of these interviews, is that 
that is a relatively minor focus for Japanese investors. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Isn't that buttressed by the fact that 
there's been a shift in investment to Eastern Europe as well? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: To Latin America? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: And they--and as Professor Krause said 
earlier, you know, the Japanese think all this fuss about a little 
part of the world like Eastern Europe when, in fact, Asia is much 
more important. They've also felt burned on the bank loans 
they've made to Latin America. They have told me that their 
investments do well in Latin America. That is, the companies make 
profits but they can't get the money out at a decent exchange 
rate, either because of exchange rate policies or because of 
inflation in the local economy, so that ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's particularly true in Brazil. 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Right! So if the idea is to somehow 
support a parent company, their feeling is that it's a kind 
subsidy to Brazil or to Peru, and there is some concern about 
trying to provide economic sustenance for Japanese migrants in 
that part of the world. But in all of these conversation in which 
they kind of evoke these high-minded concerns (and this is not a 
criticism of them at all) they say the bottom line is we're in it 
for profit and if we can't make a profit it's not very 
interesting. 
The bankers are very unhappy with various debt reduction 
schemes that emanate from either the u.s. Treasury or some other 
part of the world which mean lost profits and debt service 
payments for the Japanese who did it at the request of the United 
States. They see that their investments have done well in Latin 
America but they can't exchange it into Yen to serve a parent 
company, so my sense is that they are not really just waiting to 
invest lots of Yen in Latin America. 
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And one leading banker I asked very directly about the 
free-trade accord, and he said, "If Mexico achieves a free-trade 
accord and if that is shown to be durable and if there are several 
years of sustained recovery in Mexico, then we will consider going 
back in. So I think the opportunities elsewhere look better to 
them, and this is on the basis of a rather hard-nosed reading of 
economic factors. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's even applicable to real estate 
interests in California. 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Yes. I would agree. I sense that there 
are two kinds of concern in Japan as they look on this free-trade 
movement. First, the main thing they want to do is sustain a 
close relationship with the United States. They don't want to do 
anything in Latin America that would threaten the quality or the 
possibilities of an enhanced and close relationship with the 
United States. Many of the decisions they make are filtered 
through the United states. I asked a number of Japanese 
politicians and bureaucrats if they check with Washington before 
they do things or take steps in Latin America, and they do. I 
asked the Canadian Embassy if they ever heard of the Japanese 
cecking in Washingtonbefore they deal with Canada, and they'd 
never heard of that. So clearly, the Japanese recognize what they 
see as historic long-standing spheres of influence relationships 
between the u.s. and Latin America. And much of what they do in 
terms of overseas assistance is done at the behest of the United 
States and in some ways more to serve the United States then it is 
to serve Latin America. 
Second, I believe, they are very worried about the formation 
of exclusive regional blocks. That 1s, notwithstanding the 
objective economic foundations for an Asian block, that Professor 
Krause talked about. My sense from these conversations is that 
they're very worried about having to create an Asian block. For 
two reasons: they see more inequalities in Asia than in Europe, 
and many of the bankers and investors kept referring spontaneously 
to the image of Mr. Fuji. They kept saying, "We are Mt. Fuji, and 
the rest of Asia is the plains", and you can't create a durable 
region on that basis. Secondly, they're very concerned about the 
historic legacies of World War II, and the image of Japan 
throughout Asia. So their sense is they can't create a region 
under Japanese leadership as easily as we could create a region or 
block in the Western Hemisphere notwithstanding the complexitiees 
of our relations, and not as easily as Europe is already being 
able to create a region. 
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So I'm not sure it's on the basis of principle against 
regional blocks, although this is often invoked in a kind of 
theoretical sense; but much more because they feel that they would 
be disadvantaged in an environment where they had to create a 
regional block. So they want to take a lot steps, or whatever 
steps they can, to prevent that. And in this sense, investment in 
Latin American might be useful as one bureacrat told me, "That is 
why we are interested in Latin America -- not necessarily to 
prevent the formation of free-trade movements -- but to be sure 
that they are not closed out of some of these opportunities. 
In this sense, my feeling is that the Japanese are more 
sympathetic to the idea of a U.S.jMexico bilateral agreement than 
to a hemisphere-wide FTA as envisioned by President Bush. 
There were several reactions to the President's speech in 
late June. One, a free-trade zone between Canada, the U.S. and 
all of Latin America is unrealistic; it's irresponsible, it's not 
practical and therefore inappropriate. Second, they were 
concerned that it represents a sort of latter-day reincarnation of 
the Monroe Doctrine -- of the Americas -- for Americans and not 
for anyone else. And thirdly, they suspect that it will actually 
postpone investment in Mexico because investors in Japan and 
elsewhere will wait to see which country gets the best deal with 
the u.s. and which country can then offer them the best deal in 
terms of low-cost labor, investment and access to U.S. markets. 
So, in short, the irony is that President Bush's announcement 
might hasten the achievement, or the writing down, of the 
U.S.jMexican accord because he indicated there that that was one 
of his priorities. But at least from the perspective of Japan, I 
suspect Europe as well, it migh postpone the realization of its 
potential benefits because investors will hang back to wait to see 
what happens with other countries in other regions and whether 
they might not be able to achieve a better agreement or deal 
somewhere else in the hemisphere and get an even better point of 
access to the U.S. market. 
I conclude then, Mr. Chairman, with six very general and 
simple recommendation. 
First, that as one looks at the free-trade movements; both in 
regard to U.S.jMexico, and the hemisphere as a whole, that it is 
very important to recognize the stakes for California. Whatever 
happens, California will.be the place where the effects are most 
dearly felt. 
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Second, I would urge very active steps, and perhaps these are 
already underway, to take part in the process -- to lobby and talk 
with our representatives who are crrying out the negotiations with 
Mexico. I might say -- I know the Mexican end of this better than 
the u.s. end it is a rather small closed group of very 
brilliant "technocrats" in Mexico. It's not a very open process. 
On the other hand, talking with either or both sides to reflect 
and represent the interests of this State seems to me to be 
essential. 
Thirdly, watch the fine print, and maybe it isn't even fine 
print. My feeling would be that it is possible that better no 
agreement than a bad agreement because California will be the 
place where the effects of a bad agreement would have the most 
deleterious consequences. 
Fourthly, I believe, along with Professor Johnson, that we 
must keep our eye on the long-term, not to ask what these 
agreements would do between now and 1993, '94 or '95, but ask for 
the kind of industrial policy and relationship we would like to 
have beyond the year 2000. 
Fifthly, I think it is essential, as one looks at the Pacific 
Rim integration, to contemplate the role of Latin America in the 
Pacific, and the relationship between any free-trade agreements 
involving Latin America and/or Mexico and the u.s. and the 
implications of those arrangements for increased trade and 
investment and access to the Asian markets as well. 
Lastly, I beseech you to help us to avoid over-politicization 
of the process. It's hard enough to achieve a free-trade 
agreement, it's harder to achieve a free-trade agreement that 
respects appropriate limits on investment as well as other flows 
of economic factors. It's very tempting to have built into this 
pressure on Mexico and Latin America for the drug wars, for 
example, or for political reform that will simply be 
counter-productive and deleterious. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Petroleum, in talking to the Mexican 
counterparts, does it become a part of the agreement or not? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: That is a major question within Mexico. In 
the same day, from people of equal authority, I heard the same 
answers. One said, "Absolutely not, it is symbolic. We cannot 
touch it anymore than you could change your constitution". Others 
say that there may be ways of achieving subcontracting and so on. 
I think it's very unlikely that Mexico could permit U.S. companies 
to come in and dig for oil, excavate for oil, but they could 
increase, they can create, contracts for purchase of oil drilling 
equipment. They can, perhaps, go into joint ventures in a variety 
of places within Mexico or offshore elsewhere. 
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That is--my guess is that the publ stance .~n Mexico is 
"absolutely not". I spoke with one of the people most involved in 
these negotiations in PEMEX. He said that his instructions were 
to avoid anything that would permit any kind of subcontracting. 
He said that a good New York lawyer can take a subcontract and 
divide it into six parts and none of them is a subcontract, but 
when you add them up it is. He says he is under instructions not 
to permit that to happen, but by the same token, some of the 
people involved in the free-trade negotiations themselves, from 
Mexico, say maybe there will be ways to do it. 
It is, at the moment, I suspect, one of the most 
controversial and difficult issues from Mexico's point of view. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES; My talks with President Salinas de Gortari 
and Commerce Secretary, Jaime Serra Puche, in terms of the economy 
just in May, indicated that there have been significant steps 
taken by the Mexicans with respect to, obviously, the 
privatization of the banks and the foreign investment as it 
relates to resort development in which 40 miles of the Baja 
coastline are being developed now by Japanese interest. Are those 
steps that the Japanese view as significant from their 
perspective? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: They regard the policy steps as 
significant. They gave me the impression they were waiting to see 
the effect; both in terms of economic recovery and whether 
Salinas' successor will continue the policies in the same way. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you believe that there is a similarity 
between steps being taken in Brazil with Salinas' steps as well, 
as two economies that are moving ahead? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: I think -- yes, I think in general, if one 
thinks of each of these kind of readjustment packages -- each one 
has a different sort of emphasis. The Brazilians, not being quite 
so close to the United States, have a different kind of tradition 
with regard to foreign investment. They are less concerned with 
the background of the investors and whether they're U.S. citizens 
or foreign citizens, and more concerned with the performance and 
how they behave once they're in Brazil. That is, they tax them 
more, or they are likely to take some other kind of measure. 
Yes, I think that what one is seeing is that throughout Latin 
America, there is a remarkable wave of these kind of restructuring 
or economic readjustment programs that vary from place to place 
because of the specifics. 
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They show almost no variation by political propensity of the 
incumbent. That is you have Mennem in Argentina, a Peronist and a 
populist; Fujimori, elected as a populist, now in office as a 
moderate; Salinas who came in as a technocrat. It almost seems to 
make no difference what the political background is, but there are 
two schools of thought. One is the international environment is 
giving these counhtries no choice and they all have to do the same 
thing. the other is that they all have finally realized that 
laissez-faire economics is the best. I am a little inclined 
toward the first solution because I'm not sure that these are 
changes of faith. I think that Salinas, for example, has seen his 
options reduced and, of course, in the last two years he went to 
Europe and he was told basically, "We're not going to invest in 
Mexico, we're going to invest in East Europe". 
He went to Japan in mid-June, as his advance man told me in 
Tokyo, to sell free trade -- meaning the back door -- and a week 
later President Bush unveiled the Hemisphere-wide Plan, so all of 
the Japanese investors stood back and said, "Wait a minute, 
Mexico's not special anymore". So my feeling is that these are 
kind of instrumental pragmatic responses that are all ••• they tend 
to be taking the same shape. But unless they work, unless they 
begin to show some result, I could also anticipate waves of 
populist reaction in a variety of these countries. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Okay, when Japan is not finding the labor 
force for labor-intensive industries within its own boundaries, is 
it realistic to say that they are not going to continue to invest 
in Brazil or in Mexico, where the resources of petroleum and other 
raw materials, as well as labor, with the maquiladora and where 
those approaches are viable options for them? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: I think they will search for labor force, 
whether they feel they have to do with a Latin America, or that's 
the best place to do it is ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What other optio~s do they have? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Robotics is one, the maquiladoras, as you 
mentioned, are another. But I think that they feel that the 
maquiladoras (and there are experts in this room who know more 
about this than I do) but the Japanese perspective is that the 
maquiladores as we have come to know them, and perhaps love them, 
may not last forever. The advantage of a free-trade arrangement 
is that it is broader and more durable and offers more security 
from the viewpoint of investors. They are aware of some disputes 
in Mexico over the role of the maquiladoras, as well as the 
reactions of u.s. labor and other groups in this country. 
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So I'm not sure that they see that's a long-turm solution 
forever, although, as everyone knows, they are very prominantly 
invested in the maquiladoras sector. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What were their perceptions toward 
Vietnamese petroleum? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That question was never raised? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Not while I was there. I did have some 
discussions about what was likely to be from the viewpoint of the 
Japanese Foregin Ministry, the most interesting event of the 
forthcoming year, and they all said it was Gorbachev's visit, for 
a variey of reasons. One of the envisioned trade-offs is that if 
they can achieve some kind of normalization of relations, that ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: On the island issue? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Part of the discussions that we had on this 
commission that I served on dealing with immigration, patterns in 
law, the politicalization of the Brazil program and what it 
represents symbolically in terms of the Latino community in 
America, especially in the Southwest, is a notion that we need to 
reform .... That if a free-trade agreement emerges that's realistic 
for both sides, that immigration is going to be a key element of 
that agreement and that California, probably more than any other 
state, is going to be impacted by the politics as well as by the 
economic and societal impact of that accord. The notion of new 
type of permit or immigration permit for Mexican nationals to come 
into California, to travel at-will for economic purposes and 
return at the end of the day, more so than itjs being done now, is 
a viable option that we ought to pursue. What's your perspective 
on that? 
PROFESSOR SMITH: I agree with that. I think it not only is, 
in some ways, a requirement of the logic of a free-trade 
agreement, that you will get more pressure from for that reason, 
but my feeling is that the govenment people were more political in 
this sense--about calculating relations with the u.s. than the 
investors were themselves and the bankers were in-between. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much Professor Smith. 
PROFESSOR SMITH: Thank you. thank you very much. 
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D. Private Sector Perspectives: 
California and the Free Trade Movement 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Richard Sinkin, President Inter-American 
Holdings. Well, we've heard the academic response, now lets hear 
from the private entrepreneur. 
MR. RICHARD SINKIN: Well, my name's Richard Sinkin with 
Inter-American Holdings Company in San Diego. You're probably 
familiar with the University of California and other organizations 
that have been represented here but not with our company, I 
suspect. I'd like to take just a brief minute and tell you what 
it is we do and why ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Sure! 
MR.SINKIN: ... and why I'm qualified to speak here. 
Inter-American Holdings is a three year-old company that has four 
basic business activities. It engages in -- all involved with 
U.S./Mexican economic relations in one form or another. We manage 
an equity fund that is largely made up of Mexican financial 
institutions as the investors and the purpose of that fund is to 
invest in u.s. low-tech or mid-tech manufacturing operations whose 
production we can restructure, as well as finances of the company 
we can restructure, largely by moving production to a maquiladora 
and by adding value to the company. We are looking for strategic 
buyers in Mexico to buy these companies, who would then be able to 
use that already-established structure to penetrate the u.s. 
market. It's a little bit on the model of what Vitro did with 
Anchor Glass, but it's at a much smaller scale, obviously. 
The second activity we're engaged in is we do a lot of 
investment banking work. We have, through our banking sources in 
Mexico and United States, abilities to finance companies going to 
Mexico and we put together financing packages and help people do 
investment work there. We also manage companies who want to go 
and produce in Mexico but don't want to set up wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or corporations there. I think we're the fourth or 
fifth largest shelter operators in Tijuana right now. And we 
began as a consulting company before we got into these other 
activities through the partners. The various partners of the firm 
have set up 14 maquiladoras occupying a little over 1,200,000 
square feet and applying close to 3,000 individuals ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Along the border. 
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MR. SINKIN: ... almost exclusively along the bo~der. We did 
a large facility in Ensenada for Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 
it's western division headquartered in northern California in 
Somoa, that's really the only off-border--direct borders .•. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What were they manufacturing? 
MR. SINKIN: They are going to do wood products down there. 
They're going to barge in rough-cut lumber and dry it and then 
plane it and mill it and remanufacture it and ship it back to 
Southern California by barges. It's $100 million project --
twelve factories -- 1,200 employees when all is said and done. 
It's four/five year project. The first factory came on-line this 
week and is now shipping milled lumber back to southern California 
in barges. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Lumber from where? 
MR. SINKIN: The lumber is from Louisiana Pacific's holdings, 
plus other lumber that it get up in there -- it saws it in the 
North and then ships it South by barge. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Hmm. 
MR. SINKIN: So that's what we do. We're involved very much 
in border concerns. I just completed a week-long trip with the 
Secretary of Commerce from Mexico -- Jaime Serra Puche whom you 
obviously know, as well as the u.s. negotiating team and the 
entire key group of the Mexican negotiating team for the 
free-trade agreement. And what I'd like to do is amplify a little 
bit about what Peter Smith was talking about, about the Mexican 
perspective and the U.S. perspective on this free-trade agreement. 
This thing has been primarily a Mexican initiative. The 
roles have been reversed in sort of interesting ways. 
Historically the United States has been pressuring Mexico for 
free-trade agreement. I think for the first time now Mexico's 
really taking the lead in this and there has been some reluctance 
in Washington to enter into the game. 
There was a very sizable internecine struggle inside the Bush 
Administration with Carla Hills, u.s. trade representative and 
Clayton Yeutter, the agricultural representative, really opposing 
a fast track trade agreement. The Texans, on the other hand, 
Mosbacher, Baker, really prevailed in the struggle and the Texans 
are running the show. I say that, I am a Texan and I have close 
connections to these people, for a long time, and they are playing 
a very, very important role. I think that has important 
implications for California that I'd like to come back to, but 
obviously the changes in Mexico are really what drove this. 
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As Peter mentioned, Salinas de Gortari went to the World 
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland and basically said, "I'm going 
to throw a foreign investment party. I'd like everybody to come". 
And the Europeans threw up their hands and said, "We're not 
interested, we've got our own if we're going to do low-cost labor 
production, we're going to do it in Central Europe. The European 
market is forming and we have no interest in coming". 
The Japanese have essentially been telling Mexico, "Until 
there is change in your foreign investment laws, and guaranteed 
access to the u.s. economy, other than through the maquiladora, 
we're not going to be major investors in Mexico". And so those 
were driving forces for the Mexicans. And on the U.S. side, the 
willingness to enter into the game really came about because of 
the changes that Mexico is undertaking. And I think they're very 
under appreciated really in the United States. The dramatic 
perestroika which has occurred there; obviously you understand it, 
but I really believe Senator, that most Americans don't have a 
clue as to what's going on. We ... I speak to lots of local groups 
just right here on the border and the understanding of Mexico and 
what's happening there is ... is at ground zero. I mean it's really 
the point as you pull out the map and you do the blue parts water 
and the brown parts land. I mean that's about the level of 
knowledge. 
The entrance of Mexico into the GATT, the reduction of 
inflation to the levels of nearly 200% to 20%, the change in 
government deficit would be a model, I think, for everybody, 
including this country. The maquiladora movement, the investment 
rules that are changing, ultimately the laws that will be 
changing, all of these really represent a major change which is 
driving this free trade agreement. The other side of it, of 
course, is that the Mexicans recognize very clearly that 80% of 
the capital flows in the world flow among first world nations and 
that the entire third world competes for the other 20% and that 
with the formation of Europe and the economic power of Japan and 
the lack of interest that Japan has had in Mexico and the rest of 
Latin America, the Mexicans understand that really ••• as Henry 
Kissinger said, "the absence of alternatives clears the mind 
wonderfully". That's clearly what's happened here, the absence of 
alternatives, I think, rather than some philosophical or 
ideological change. 
I mean this is really out of strict necessity and the 
Mexicans who are going to negotiate this are young, pragmatists, 
almost all educated in the United States. These are people who 
have a deal in mind and they want to make it •.. they really want to 
make a deal. They're not really operating out of any ideological 
vent, and they're very very much afraid of being left out in the 
formation of trading blocks. 
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They are absolutely convinced that Europe is going to be 
closed to Mexico and they're absolutely convinced that they will 
never be successful in Asia and they look around, there's nothing 
else but the United States, so all of these things coming together 
are really driving this free trade agreement. 
Based on this week of travelling with them and watching them 
sell this agreement to New York, Houston, Dallas, Chicago and Los 
Angeles on Friday, where actually we . participated, I brought you 
the participation book and if you have trouble sleeping at night, 
this will cure all of your problems, I guarantee you. The view 
that I'm getting of a likely free trade will include the 
following. Canada will be seriously involved. The goal really 
for both the United States and Mexico and now Canada is a North 
American free trade community, a trading community. The view is 
that Bush may have complicated things by launching the hemispheric 
initiative and they wish that that had been held off until this 
deal was done, but apparently it wasn't. 
There will be a phased in reduction of tariffs and while it's 
true that investment and other issues are important, trade is 
still very very important in this structure, particularly in the 
economies of steel and agriculture and textiles. Those are, I 
think the three hottest trade issues that will be on the table. 
Mexicans and u.s. teams seem both very concerned about having 
close regulations of subsidies and countervailing duty structures 
and the dispute mechanism that's going to be proposed by the U.S. 
side is the same dispute mechanism that's governing the 
Canada-u.s. trade agreement which they're all saying works very 
well. I don't know from any personal experience but Ann Hughes 
(who is the Deputy Secretary for Western Hemisphere and who 
is ... was one of the negotiators for Canada and is on the trade 
dispute mechanism committee with Canada) says that they've 
resolved very very quickly and efficiently given the mechanisms 
that were set up in the Canada-u.s. agreement. So, the Mexicans 
seem comfortable with that, the Americans really want it, the 
Canadians would like it because it makes it parallel across both 
borders. 
The general impression I have, a very strong one, is that 
neither side, neither the Mexican or U.S. side, will consider 
migration in these negotiations. That is really not on the table 
as a discussion. Everybody is aware that it has major 
implications for what happens but they do not see this as part of 
the trade agreement directly and the Mexicans very much want to 
have it outside of this. And I think from what I understand from 
the folks who will be involved from at least the Department of 
Commerce side of this, they've agreed to that already. 
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The final element of this is that, well there's actually two, 
one is that petroleum will also be off the table in terms of 
demanding a change in the structure of the way Mexico handles 
petroleum. But, as Peter says, and I think he's absolutely right, 
there will be discussion of how to get around that in a way that 
satisfies everybody's needs. And the use of trusts and a variety 
of other things are being held out as ways of making this sort of 
thing happen. 
CHAIRMAN 
developments? 
TORRES: What's happening already in resort 
MR. SINKIN: It's happening in resort devlopment, it's 
happening in a variety ... it's been happening for a long long time 
so ••. but their view is they're not going to make any ..• they•re not 
going to negotiate anything that is going to require any 
constitutional change. The most they're going to do is change the 
foreign investment laws and there will be an initiative submitted 
to Congress early next year that will fundamentally bring the laws 
into compliance with the way the regulations are now written. So 
it's usually the regs that make the laws work; it's going to be 
the other way around in Mexico. 
What are the issues that will affect California in this? I 
think there are several. One is the agricultural side which is 
not an area I know a lot about, but it certainly has been a topic 
of discussion a great deal. The Mexicans are selling this 
agreement on the basis of complementarities. Their argument is 
that the agricultural cycles in the United States and the 
agricultural cycles in Mexico are different and that products come 
on line at different times and that, in fact, this will be a 
benefit for both sides, winter vegetables being the clearest 
example where the United States buys substantial amounts. The 
questions of tomatoes and other things, avocados, for example, 
which is a very important issue here, are yet to be resolved. 
A second issue for California is the shift of low tech 
manufacturing to Mexico now that the rules of the game are clear. 
What's inhibited a lot of manufacturing, especially in small to 
mid-size companies from going is just the Mexican fog, we call it, 
don't understand what's going on down there. When the rules of 
the game are made more clear, I think the view of everyone is that 
there will be a shift of low tech manufacturing, and the sales 
pitch that is being made is that you would rather have those jobs 
go to Mexico. You're going to lose them anyway, California's 
going to lose them anyway. You'd rather have them go to Mexico 
than to Southeast ... to Southeast Asia, wherever ... because you'll 
at least get a couple of benefits. One, you may not lose the 
corporate headquarters which often happens if you go to Asia, 
people just get worn out flying across the Pacific; and two, that 
if the jobs go along the border that a substantial amount of the 
salaries will come back into the United States by the way of 
consumption of u.s. goods. 
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All of this will, however, put serious pressure on border 
infrastructure. For those of us who are moving trucks across the 
border everyday this is already a difficult issue and I think it's 
going to become much much worse and there really are not 
mechanisms for dealing with this. You know, mostly we're talking 
about Federal entities here, it's a very low priority in 
Washington. The California Legislative delegation, frankly I 
don't think has represented us all that well on these border 
issues. There are very few who really understand it. The Texans 
are much much more advanced in terms of what they're doing on 
behalf of their border communities. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's usually a Texas mentality. 
MR. SINKIN: Well, the Texan does 
Besides, part of this infrastructure 
California ports and there's going to be 
ports. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Right. 
have a border mentality. 
is going to be Southern 
much heavier use of these 
MR. SINKIN: And I think we need to be prepared for that and 
make ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How are the Mexicans preparing for that in 
terms of their industry? 
MR. SINKIN: They're not. They basically do not have any 
major port development policy ... they ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Highways? 
MR. SINKIN: Highways they're handling by privatizing the 
roads. Basically, what they've done is opened up road building to 
the private sector. They are not ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's to handle also the recent innovation 
in terms of licensure of tourist and bus companies as well. 
MR. SINKIN: Exactly, and they're going to do ... we just have 
a new client who's going to build five power plants, each one is a 
billion dollar investment--each one---and throughout Mexico on a 
"build, operate, and transfer" to the Federal Electrical 
Commission structure. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Nuclear power plant? 
MR. SINKIN: No. Coal ..• oil generated or oil burning plants. 
Mexico basically is running out of electrical power along the 
border and also they're privatizing the steel mills. 
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Another one of our clients is buying one of the steel 
mills ... wants to buy one of the steel mills that is being 
privatized, and one of their concerns is that there's not enough 
electrical power to run the steel mill at full capacity which is 
what they want to do. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Where? 
MR. SINKIN: It's Sicartsa. It's a Lazaro Cardenas 
Industrial Complex in Michoacan. There's not enough electrical 
capacity to run that mill at full power so our other client wants 
to build a plant right there to support this group of Brits who 
are buying the steel mill. This is very very complex on how this 
all works but basically the infrastructure is being privatized in 
a certain way, but ports are a problem. You can•t .•. unless 
you•re ... you can, as a private individual, build a port in Mexico. 
You can get a permit to do that, but to make use of the ports that 
already exist is really quite ... there just aren't the resources 
there to do that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And where are they contemplating that these 
ports be located? 
MR. SINKIN: Well, they're really wherever you want them to 
be. One of the issues, built the port for the steel mill. One of 
the issues we're dealing with right now is that when this group 
buys Sicartsa, are they're also buying the port? And, if so, who 
gets to use it? I mean as long as it was a government entity then 
there were no problems. Once it becomes a private entity then you 
have very complicated ... selling a public port to a private entity 
is tricky. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Are they contemplating the establishment of 
a port close to San Diego? 
MR. SINKIN: No, they would like Ensenada to be improved. 
They have a master plan for that Governor Rufo is pushing very 
very hard. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Baja Sur. 
MR. SINKIN: Baja Norte. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Norte. 
MR. SINKIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What impact will that have on the San Diego 
economy? 
MR. 
quickly. 
SINKIN: Well, my view is it isn't going to happen very 
The real question what's going to happen in Long Beach. 
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That's the real impact because San Diego just is not a commercial 
port in a significant way and when people bring .•. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Everybody knows what's going to happen to 
Long Beach, Walt Disney is going to move in. 
MR. SINKIN: This is news to me, Senator I didn't •.. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Really. 
MR. SINKIN: Really. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Ah, L.A. Times. Major story, close to a 
three billion, allegedly a three billion dollar investment. 
MR. SINKIN: That's not going to do those of us who are 
bringing in you know pipe nipple from Korea much good, you know 
that sort of thing, but that's ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But you're saying 
for an Ensenada expansion in a port area 
not to San Diego? 
the biggest competition 
would be to Long Beach, 
MR. SINKIN: Not to San Diego. I don't ... san Diego's really 
made the commitment to have a tourist center here and with the 
navy and tourism there really isn't room in this port for 
substantial commercial expansion. It's just not there, container 
docks and these are very very serious investment and there's no 
will to do that here. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you see shift from Long Beach to 
Ensenada? 
MR. SINKIN: I think so. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Timetable? 
MR. SINKIN: Seven to ten years. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How would you compare ... other things that 
the Legislative delegation in California has not been effective, 
as effective as the Texas delegation ... what other analogies might 
I take advantage of to tell my colleagues? 
MR. SINKIN: Well, you know, we ... what I think California 
needs to have is a joint public private sector negotiating team in 
place here that represents California's interest. I couldn't 
agree more with Peter about the ... bad agreement would be a 
disaster for the State and we have to be represented and ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And we're not. 
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MR. 
article 
that ... 
SINKIN: We're not. Diane Linquist is here, wrote an 
for the San Diego Union on Sunday and really pointed out 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That she could write. 
MR. SINKIN: She's a good writer and she pointed out that 
it's really a Texas show ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Misquote, it's a misquote. 
MR. SINKIN: It's a misquote. 
AUDIENCE: Laughter. 
MR. SINKIN: She pointed out that it's really a Texas show 
and the private sector folks in Texas are really close to Carla 
Hills, very close to Roger Wallace, who's going to be the 
Department of Commerce individual ... he's really going to be the 
number two person to Carla Hills and you ... we don•t ..• r ... as far 
as I can tell I mean I was on the show for a week, road show with 
these guys for a week and I didn't see any Californians. Not a 
one playing at the level that they ought to be. I think we were 
the closest people to it. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Are they getting back to us because of how 
Reagan treated the Texans during his presidency? 
MR. SINKIN: I don't think so. I just think it's pure 
economics, you know, driving the deal here. The Texans are in 
Washington, they're in the White House, they're in the Department 
of Commerce, they're very very aware and they're much more aware 
of the need for this free trade agreement for them. California 
has been rock and roll here for so many years that we kind of, you 
know, Mexico is just out there. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Okay, thank you very much. 
MR. SINKIN: Thank you. Let me leave this with you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, thanks. Since I'm looking over 
election results, I think this might prove to be more interesting. 
MR. SINKIN: I think so. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I appreciate your time with us. 
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III. COMPETITIVENESS 
A. Need for a statewide Competitive strategy 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You are so efficient, Professor Johnson, 
thank you for coming up. Professor Chalmers Johnson, welcome to 
the Committee. 
PROFESSOR CHALMERS JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very 
much. My pleasure to be here. My task this morning, I think, is 
to provide some of the red meat of controversy. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I thought more vegetarian 
spirituality •.•. (laughter) 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: In a sense that I guess my specific 
points are to respond to and are tied to the Committee's work with 
Assembly Bill 2852 which says "Existings law does not provide for 
a Global Applied Technology Extension Service", or Assembly Bill 
3625 with the statement "Existing law does not provide for the 
development of a strategic plan for technology development and 
deployment in California". 
I want to talk about industrial policy a little bit, which is 
enormously controversial. And let me begin with a couple of --
like an established preacher -- with a couple of texts. First, 
the speech on September 26th to the Semiconductor Industry 
Association by Dr. Andrew Grove, President and Chief Executive 
Officer in INTEL Corporation. He traces a systematic, in his 
view, decline of the American technological base. He sees 
worries about -- the future of the semi conductor industry as a 
whole. He blames government for "a religious devotion to 
laissez-faire philosophy in the face of Japanese 
new-mercantilism", and makes various other comments. He points 
out that the wealth-creating capacity of the United States is at 
rish because our tgechnological base is eroding in so many 
industries and points out that such a loss of wealth has 
historically contributed to social instability. Grove was the 
individual who recently sent Budget Director, Richard Darmond, a 
violin so that Mr. Darmond might pass the time fiddling while the 
u.s. electronics industry burns. 
The second text comes from Timothy Stone, the Chief of 
Corporate Intelligence for Motorola. He has recently outlined the 
destruction of America's technological foundations through the 
year 2000. Let me just offer you a study--an overview of Stone's 
work. 
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In the time period of the 1950's and 1960's, looking at the 
evolution of Japan's electronic industry, he sees the global 
objective in that period catch up with the West's strategic 
emphasis -- quality; the target industries -- TV's and radios. 
In the 1970's, the Japanese global objective was global 
market expansion. This strategic emphasis aesthetic 
design/product refinement; the target industries -- cameras, audio 
equipment and VCR's. 
For the 1980's, the Japanese global objective was market 
domination. The strategic emphasis product innovation; the 
target industries -- laptop PC's, fax machines, 8mm videos. 
For the 1990's, the global objective, as mr. Stone and 
Motorola see it there, of course, in a joint venture with Toshiba, 
for the global objectives for 1990's--market creation and becoming 
the technology leader. The strategic emphasis on research 
creativity, technology integration; the target industries, 
opto-megatronics, bio-electronics, super-conductivity. 
And for the year 2000 +, he sees the global objective for 
Japan, global leadership role -- international contribution; the 
strategic emphasis, spiritual and physical well-being; the target 
industries -- bio-megatronics, bio-communications, neuro-computing 
and other very advanced technologies. 
I raise these, to say that it's not news that Japan and the 
United States are on a collision course. What really is news is 
how enormously controversial this issue is. This year, 1990, 
marks the 22nd year of American trade deficits with Japan. 
Deficits that are now so large they threaten to destroy the gobal 
trading system. Japan is, as we well know, the financier of 
America's fiscal and trade deficits and we have been made 
enormously vulnerable by -- in our recent negotiations over the 
structural impediments initiative by Japan's usage of its fiscal 
leverage to intimidate us. I mean to say that if we don't cover 
the next trip -- that if we don't if we keep pushing in its 
particular position, Japan might not come to the next treasury 
auction. 
Particularly important to California, Japan is the leader of 
a campaign of direct investment in American that is unprecedented 
in its scope and velocity and is, of course, the major source of 
long-term capital on Earth today. 
40 
These, and other aspects of Japan's amazing economic 
achievements are well-known. It is also, I think, important to 
stress, as we talk about the Pacific Rim, Japan is the genuine 
superpower of this part of the world. It produces 50% of the GDP 
of the Pacific. That is, all other nations combined, including 
the five states of the United States. So that it•s ... it's .•. 
sometimes people speak of Taiwan and Korea in the same breath, but 
there really is no comparison of the enormous size of the Japanese 
economy, both manufacturing and financially. 
The controversy arises over how to explain these events and 
what to do about them. On the one hand, professional 
neo-classical economists and an array of lobbyist, apologists, and 
public relations specialists, claim that the Japanese economy is 
just like any other capitalist economy. Although they usually do 
not read a word of Japanese, and have made no empirical study of 
the Japanese economy, they claim that the Japanese just get up 
earlier, work harder and save and invest more than their 
competitors. This school is often known as "The Chrysanthemum 
Club". I like to say that at time, I believe, much of the 
economics profession is riding on Japan today, sounds very much 
like medical doctors working for the tobacco industry. That's my 
own view of this. 
On the other hand, scholars of the Japanese state 
bureaucracy, myself included, some American trade negotiators, 
many American manufacturers who have competed successfully 
everywhere else on earth except Japan, argue that the Japanese 
economy is different from that described in American economic 
models -- that it is a capitalist developmental state that the 
role of the state has a quite different role in it -- or position 
of the state than in neo-classical economic theory. 
This school has been dubbed "the revisionists" because its 
members are attempting to revise orthodox American policy by 
calling for specific trade measures, tailor-made for Japan. This 
latter group, it seems to me, is beginning to achieve some small 
measure of success as seen, for example, in the Bush 
Administration's structural impediments initiative to pen the 
Japanese market. I don't thing that this was well founded or that 
it's going to succeed, but it's the first time th U.S. government 
ever undertook such an attempted reform against another government 
that amounts to very serious interference in, what are perfectly 
obviously, domestic affairs. It did cause some Japanese to come 
back with some structural impediments initiative in American 
proposing that every American be limited to one credit card, and a 
few others. There is that order to the discussion. 
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Everyone agrees that many things have contributed to the 
collision course and that to single out any of them as central is 
a source of error. I think all of us stipulate that for 
functional industrial policy in the United States we must, at some 
point, resume financing our own government, provide incentives for 
our people to save instead of consume, to progressively reorient 
our engineering from military to commercial products, and to get 
much more serious about educating the labor force, and 
particularly at the required level. 
There is one cause of the trade deficit, however, that is 
extremely controversial and this is Japan's industrial 
policy--"sangyo seisaku". Industrial policy is to 
English-speaking economists, something akin to sin. It means 
governmental affirmative action on behalf of domestic industry to 
foster the orderly retreat of declining industries, and to build a 
high-value added industries of the future. It works on the supply 
side, and takes as its criterion the number of truly valuable jobs 
held by a nation's workers. I want to stress this. The Japanese 
govenment, in implementing its industrial policy, does not take, 
as its criterion of success, global efficiency. Its criterion of 
success is the number of truly valuable jobs held by Japanese. I 
regard this as perfectly plausible governmental objective. But 
we're talking, past each other often, when, to the extent that our 
industrial policy is being forced to conform to a body of abstract 
thought, the Japanese industrial policy favors computer chips over 
potato chips. I have in mind here the fact that the current head 
of the Council of Economic Advisors to the u.s. President said 
that, in his view, there was no difference. 
The Japanese are past masters at industrial policy which they 
began to employ during the late 1800's. The most important 
command posts within their economic general staff, the ministry of 
international trade and industry, is called "The Industrial Policy 
Bureau". The prime tools of industrial policy are export 
incentives, trade barriers to protect the home market, low-cost 
credit, pro-business/environmental and educational policies, 
unorthodox accounting practices and other incentives to cause 
private firms to go into government approved industries, foreign 
commercial intelligence services, nationalistic patent policies-it 
took 29 years for Texas Instruments to get its basic patent on the 
integrated circuit in the Japanese market. Now, Texas Instruments 
will make substantial royalties throughout the rest of the 1990's 
but, during that 29 years, memory chips were lost completely to 
the Japanese market. 
42 
A host of other forms of 
stress that public subsidies are 
there is Japanese subsidizat of 
things, but it is not primari a 
me, a matter of strategy 
covert activns (want to 
not very important; that is, 
research cartels and other such 
of money) is, it seems to 
chal 
shibboleths of 
competitiveness. 
those who invest in pol 
for example, Pat Choate 
documented. In fact, 
specific antidote to 
industries such as machine 
do not wish to protect 
or inefficiently managed 
we need these industries 
of the government to ass 
beyong the old 
fields and 
protectionism are 
in new equipment -- as, 
new book, "Agents of Influence" 
seems to me, industrial policy is the 
important but weak 
robotics. That is to say, we 
we know are uncompetitive 
but in some cases 
becomes a function 
The idea of a level means that people should 
play the same rules. But s the Japanese play by different 
rules, and since we've had success in agreeing on what 
a new set of common rules look like, we must learn to match 
rather than to imitate with them. We certainly have 
discovered that we and ffer almost entirely of what 
might be meant the or "liberalizationF". 
that is the case of of liberalized Japanese 
financial markets the 1980's, the Japanese Ministry of finance 
made it clear to us that had analyzed the effects of what we 
were proposing and that the effects would make eight of the ten 
largest banks on earth Japanese. then said "If you want to 
call that liberalization, we 11 to If it wasn't going 
to that outcome, we shouldn't have agreed to it." 
The idea currently popular in some American business schools 
American firms lack competitiveness. Actually, it seems 
to me American firms are primari products of and responding 
to the short-term incentives and s ls sent out by the American 
pol 1 and financ 1 until these are changed, 
there is no such thing, as an enterprise-level 
solution to the problem 
Let me conclude, Japan differs almost completely from the 
United States in its history of industrialization, in the role of 
the state in it, and the p of economic affairs in national 
security Japan is not, however, unique. It is similar to that 
other great late developer -- Bismarckian Germany. Both began 
intentially to catch up with the original beneficiaries of the 
industrial revolution at about the same time ... l868 for Japan, 
1870 for Germany. 
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Both have experimented for more than a century with 
corporatist forms of social goal-setting while retaining the 
efficiency of the market. It is an Anglo-American conceit that 
either Germany or Japan should play by same rules simply because 
after World War II they were briefly occupied by the allied 
powers. 
The challenge for American nationalist corporate economic 
policy is to recognize our differences in Japan and above all to 
begin to formulate strategies for managing them. It also seems to 
me to be the indispensable first step toward avoiding another 
national collision. 
Let me then try to bring this abstract discussion of 
industrial plicy down to California cases, which is what 
particularly interests you. It seems to me that one of the most 
controversial issues in America today is the fact that we have 50 
industrial policies for each state, but we don't have one for the 
nation. This produces contempt in Japan. I mean the fact that 
Kentucky paid $150 million to attract a corporation to invest in 
Kentucky worth $16 billion, and that the purpose of this 
investment was to prevent (or this money expenditure was to 
prevent) Toyota from going to Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio 
produces a sense, I believe, in Japan that these people don't know 
what they're doing. 
So this issue, I believe, is (particularly if California is 
the largest and best represented state) that we should not 
underestimate the influence that California can have in producing 
national response to the Pacific Basin. 
A second implication here is that high-tech industries are 
particularly important in California. That is, by high-tech 
industries we mean industries with very high R & D costs, and 
relatively short product life cycles. Which means, in fact, if 
that's the only business you're in and you're in it to make a 
profit, you're probably today going out of business if you're 
trying to compete with the Japanese "Keiretsu". Where the 
Japanese "Keiretsu" are in these businesses not to make a profit 
but to provide jobs for their people for the future -- really good 
jobs. And they are very strongly supported by the government. 
It seems to me that in California it is critically important 
that we come up with policies that deal with the health of our 
aerospace and micro-electronics and biotechnology industries, 
particularly these which we are quite good at; and that, moreover 
it is important for us to recognize that foreign direct investment 
is a critical issue in this State. 
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The Japanese regularly say, "We ize with you, but why 
do you always blame the buyer?" That is, "Why can't you put 
together policies that would reflect what kind of investment you 
want?" And they suspect that we can't do that because we're too 
doctrinaire ... that we're too heresy to some abstract 
economic concept. But it seem to me that the lack of reciprocity 
foreign direct investment one the most critical issues 
out there right now. Japan buys what it wants in America and our 
legal system gives full r of protection as an owner. 
Whatever one may think of T. Boone , he is the owner of the 
Koito Company in the Toyota "keiretsu" and the Japanese political 
system is -- legal system in his punative rights 
as an owner. But now, if you're not playing ownership -- if 
you're not interested in ownership you're not playing 
capitalism anymore. It may be that you're playing something 
better. Maybe the something better, given 
our record of leverage manipulation of the stock 
exchange during the 1980's; very much present, 
it seems to me. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, how does it affect California's 
long-term investment strategies. 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: Well, I think thaqt we must decide what 
kind of investment we want in California. do we want joint 
ventures, do we want the buyouts, do we want greenfield start-ups? 
What's its effect on the labor force? We have a series of issues 
that have ben sensationalized in the press, but they are also 
quite present in the legal world today. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well what happens in January when a new 
governor calls you and -- she wants you to tell her what out 
to be California's policy to foreign investment. 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: We need a licensing program in 
ifornia. The Japanese regularly say to us the most common 
headl in Honolulu is. "Last Golf Course in Maui sold to 
" Now they say, "We're somewhat sympathetic to that. We 
't want the last golf course in Karuizawa sold to 
Americans--we wouldn't even let you play golf there". But, the 
issue is: why do you always blame the buyer? If you want some 
municipal golf courses in Maui, or some other such way, produce a 
plicy that will influence this investment -- that will direct it 
the way you want to go. Similarly, in big purchases such as 
Columbia Pictures by Sony, this raises the whole issue of 
intellectual property rights -- whether these should be sold or 
should have been licensed. When Mr. Morita was asked whether the 
American film industry could make a film about Japoanese Emperor 
he said, "Yes, of course you could. We just wouldn't let you show 
it in Japan". Well, you don't make films if you can't show it in 
the second largest market. So this, in effect, does have a 
frustrating effect. 
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Let me say just a third -- put on the record -- a third area 
that seems to be as relevant to California in this context. Many 
people, I'm thinking of the Joel Kotkin book, many people believe 
that we in California have an advantage because our demographics 
are better than Japan's. We have a more interesting group of 
immigrants coming into the State, whereas, of course, Japan 
restricts all forms of immigration. You can become a citizen in 
Japan only be being a child of a Japanese male or now female (for 
the last three years). That we have a younger population, Japan 
faces an aging -- a remarkably aging -- population. That is, our 
demographics cause some in America to be optimistic, but I don't 
think they have much reason to be optimistic. Then my point here 
is that this is all true. We do have a better demographic 
composition in California than they have in Japan. But 
demographics don't add up to a strategy. Good demographics still 
will not compete with Japanese family stability, high levels of 
education. The asymmetries that we have in education .•. Let me 
just say a word about education because I know of your interest. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES : Yes . 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: It is remarkable the asymmetries betweeen 
the two countries. Japan does an absolutely superb job of 
education--in required education--producing a labor force capable 
of very high value-added manufacturing. 
Japan falls down rather badly at the University level, and 
its graduate schools are a farce. That is to say whenever I've 
heard people talk about workaholic Japanese I know they've never 
been to a Japanese university, because there you would discover 
the most extraordinary goof-offs almost anywhere on earth. By 
contrast, the American educational system does an almost 
disgraceful job of required education. Catching up enormously 
fast and at a highly elitist manner at the university level, and 
with world-leading graduate schools. I mean people still come to 
America to to to graduate school. No one we know--we know of no 
known case where someone came to America to go to elementary 
school, unless he happened to have been caught here. This, I 
think, poses another major problem for the State. Japan is very 
much aware that we do a great deal of our research and development 
in our public universities and that these are open to all comers 
on the basis of academic freedom, if they're qualified. Japan, by 
contrast, does most of its research in proprietary research 
institutes, comparable to those owned by IBM or Toshiba or things 
of this sort. This has resulted in a campaign by Japan to try to 
improve its universities, and there is a major effort to up-grade 
the main campus of Tokyo University into something like an 
international graduate school. 
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But I think the concrete result today, of this asymmetry in 
research, is extraordinary Japanese investment in acquiring the 
research product of American universities by either supporting 
research, by endowing chairs, by ... this has been controversial in 
California ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, U.C. Irvine. 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: u.c. Irvine. It's very controversial 
with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. And all I can 
really say on that is -- what I think is important to this 
Committee is that the only defense that these university 
administrators have is that they've been acting without a policy. 
That , our government leaders can be often critical of our 
universities, but at the same time they won't make a policy on how 
far we want to go with Japanese investment in higher education in 
America. Do we want to do it for research? What access do the 
Japanese firms have? ... and things of that sort. But I think I've 
exhausted my time, I thank you for your attention. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: We'll be back! 
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much Dr. Johnson. 
B. Need for Science and Technology Human Resource Development 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'd like to call on Chancellor Richard 
Atkinson, former director of the National Science Foundation and 
member of the u.s. People's Republic of China Joint commission on 
Science and Technology. 
CHAIRMfu~ TORRES: Chancellor. 
again for allowing us to 
cooperation and support by 
appreciated. 
Welcome to the Committee and thanks 
be on the campus here and your 
you and your staff is very much 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: It's good to see you again. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: It's good to see you again, too. 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: I've had a chance to look at your 
agenda for the morning and I must say you've had some interesting 
presentations. If they lived up to billing, they should have been 
a fascinating morning. Let me just begin ... ! do have a topic and 
I'll get to it very quickly but just let me make a few 
introductory remarks about this particular campus. 
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As you know, it really has its origins in science and 
technology and that's how the campus started and the early 
emphasis was very much on science and engineering programs. But a 
little over ten years ago we really recognized the importance of 
international activities, international trade, international 
affairs and began to focus subsequent expansion of the campus very 
much on international activities and part of that expansion 
involves the Graduate School of International Relations and 
Pacific Studies, the first Graduate School of International 
Relations in the University of California system. We're very 
proud of it and you've seen several faculty members from that 
School this morning. We think we are indeed recruiting a first 
quality faculty to lead that school. We have a new undergraduate 
college, fifth college, which is very much focused on 
international study, international affairs. We have a very active 
program for taking students to other nations to study and may 
surprise you but we probably have more students than any other 
University of California campus studying abroad at any time. So, 
although we're rather ... we're not nearly the size of UCLA or UC 
Berkeley, we have a tremendous emphasis on overseas studies and 
that is represented in terms of thee number of students that we 
have studying overseas. And, then finally we have very active 
foreign language instruction programs and we think we have the 
highest percentage of our undergraduated involved in foreign 
language instruction of any other public school in the State. 
So there is a strong emphasis on international activity. I 
think it's in a sense a natural following up from the early 
engineering and science emphasis ... a very natural and nice meld. 
We see some very interesting interactions between science 
activities and international affairs on this campus that I think 
have real implications for this Committee's focus this morning. 
My topic is going to be dispensed with fairly quickly because 
I have a report here, it's a reprint of an article of mine that 
appeared in Science Magazine and I've just ..• going to play on this 
for a moment by saying that I was President of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science this last year and part 
of my Presidency involved the Presidential speech and this is the 
speech published in Science Magazine. 
I say this for a reason because about three years ago I made 
a similar presentation to the Regents of the University of 
California and it focused on the issue of supply and demand for 
science and engineers, and in that earlier presentation to the 
Regents, it got a great deal of national attention and I have made 
some adjustments in terms of my predictions based on that early 
presentation. 
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The point I'm to make is that has really been 
well-vented on the national scene and locally over the last four 
years and the statements I'm going to be making, I think, are 
really quite conservative of what I judge to be 
overwhelming, shortfall and engineers that will 
begin to occur about 1995. For the next five years we're not 
going to notice that shortfall, when it sets in the mid '90's 
it will be very abrupt and 11 expand to massive proportions 
by the 2010 of the next 
I won't go through the counting .. of the, it's really gone 
through in some detail the , but just to give you a 
feeling for numbers let me take one area and talk about Ph.D's. 
The supply and demand for Ph.D's science and engineering and if 
I could just have you look at what's called page 429, this figure 
right here. This is the projected supply and demand of Ph.D's in 
science and engineering for the country as a whole and I'll try to 
focus in on California in a minute. But, you can see that we're 
going to be supplying about a little less than 12,000 Ph.D's a 
year from all the universities the United States and that 
supply fluctuates up and down over the years but stays roughly at 
that level, and then what you see are four demand curves and I 
won't go through the details of those but the D-O curves is just 
saying wherever the was year we'll just assume that 
demand is constant for But we know that's not going to 
be the case, we that D-O demand curve with the 
number of retirements can the workforce and we 
have very good data on retirements in the workforce 
that's compiled by the National Academy of Sciences, and if one 
decides you have to replace those retirements in the workforce 
that leads to the D-1 curve for the demand for Ph.D's. Then, we 
also know that starting this next decade, in the 
of the next decade 's going to be a tremendous 
ion in terms of the college age population, and if one 
assumes that we will have the same ration of teachers to students 
as that college age population expands, then we're going to have 
to increase the number of Ph.D's to meet that expansion 
requirement and that would generate cumulatively the D-2 curve. 
And, then the D-3 curve is based on an issue on how many Ph.D's 
will industry require, and this is based on the assumption that 
there is going to be about a 4 percent growth in the needs of 
industry for the number of Ph.D's. 
Again, one would have to go through all the detail of this, 
but I assure you that if we got into a discussion you would end up 
believing that my asumptions are really fairly conservative. But 
now let me examine what this implies. If you look at the year 
2010 on that curve we're going to require about 25,000 Ph.D's 
produced that year and the actual production will be about 12,000 
and that's how the matter spreads out. 
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If you'll just look at this little flow chart down on the 
bottom of that page, that gives you the average for the period 
from 1995 to the 2010 for the supply and demand under those 
different scenarios but you can see with the D-3 scenario, the 
bottom one, we're going to need about 20,000, 21,000 ... the demand 
will be for about 21,000, the supply a little over 11,000 with a 
shortfall of 9,600. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How does that compare to our other 
competitors in the world? 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: I can't, I can't really give you a 
detailed comparison. We're going ... I really can't respond to 
that. I mean I assume the rest of the nations of the world are 
going to maintain their supply of Ph.D's, roughly at the level 
they're at. We have some peculiar aspects to this situation and 
that's good question, I better be careful about the answer. I 
really don't know how it will stand in the rest of the world, but 
I do know that we're going to have this really dramatic drop and 
that we're going to have to deal with it. Now, the first point I 
would make is that the University of California supplies 10 
percent of all the Ph.D's produced in the United States, so the 
University of California is a tremendously important supplier. 
The next point I'd make is that the Federal Government has 
really walked away from graduate education and that's represented 
here in the •.. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Right, I saw that. 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: You already got to that. I mean 
here ... if you look at just the striated area in 1969 the Federal 
Government supported 60,000 fellowships at the graduate level, by 
1989 this last year were supporting about 12,000 fellowships. So 
the Federal Government just simply walked away from graduate 
support and as you well know, Senator Torres, the State of 
California has not been very forthcoming in terms of supporting 
graduate educatin in the University of California. We were really 
counting in theses last several years in readjusting our programs. 
We've had this tremendous expansion at the undergraduate level but 
have been absolutely static at the graduate level. For a campus 
like this it's been a real problem because as we've expanded 
dramatically at the undergraduate level, we've not been able to 
have a corresponding increase, even a partial increase, at the 
undergraduate level. 
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So, I think these are that should be very much on the 
minds of the Legislature, our situation in terms of productivity 
and international competitiveness depend certainly on the supply 
of technically trained people, they depend on the level of basic 
research, lots of other factors, but those are two key ones where 
the university is very much 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: as chair of the Science and 
Technology Committee a , one of the major priorities 
I put out was engineering education because even then in '83, 1 84 
we knew what was coming through the statistics that were available 
to us, and one of the factors was we are educating more 
foreign engineering Ph.D's than almost any other country combined, 
but yet they leave which on our part but from our 
own interests not necessarily a practical move for our needs. Is 
that still occurring? 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: That's a very, very strong point. I 
mention that I've made s lar presentation to the Regents about 
four years ago that I changed some of my assumptions because of a 
lot of critiquing. The assumptions that I made originally in that 
early Regents paper was that 70 percent of the foreign nationals 
receiving Ph.D's in the United States would remain in the U.S. 
workforce. That turned out with subsequent data to be just too 
optimist a number. It's now ... in paper I use 50 percent, but 
other countries are becoming so competitive, I mean Korea, Japan, 
Hong Kong and many other countries are becoming so dompetitive 
that Ph.D's that had been trained here and would have stayed here 
are now finding their way back to those countries and there's a 
lot of evidence so one might even question the 50 percent measure. 
The issue of attracting students into graduate 
education is a key one. You have to get the message out that 
there are tremendous opportunit I just this week was with the 
President of Princeton University. They have an entering graduate 
class in the Department of Astronautical and Space Sciences 15 
entering graduate students. They, of course, made offers to U.S. 
citizens and non-u.s. citizens. They have 15 entering students, 
everyone is a foreigh national. So I mean I think it's we ..• I 
wouldn't want to cut out the flow of foreign students into this 
country, but one thing we have to .. the change in immigration 
laws that permit us to in more foreign scientists is 
certainly to our advantage, 's to the the disadvantage of other 
countries but it is to our advantage. That's something that has 
been modified. The issue of drawing more American students into 
graduate education and I think hopefully holding more of the ones 
that are foreign students that are trained here is something that 
is part of the productivity base of the country. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: How do we do that with K through 12? 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: Well, you know a lot of people are 
focused on K through 12. The AAAS, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, has what's called Project 2061 which 
is named because that's the return of the Haley's Comet. The year 
that the Project started was the year that the Haley's Comet last 
passed here. The point, though, is that it's very much focused on 
science education, many groups are, the issue of bringing 
minorities into science education is a very important issue. All 
of my projections, for example, assume that the same percent of 
students will go on in science as have done so in the past but if 
you look at the minority groups, it's a much lower percentage so 
we have to bring those percentages up dramatically. 
So there are real issues in K through 12 but what I'm going 
to say now may surprise you. I've been spending some time with 
some Assistant Superintendents and school teachers and I must say 
they have a tremendous set of difficulties before them. I mean 
I •.. I mean I've ended up feeling that they were working very hard, 
I felt very sympathetic with them. They just have a tremendous 
set of responsibilities. The day I was there students were 
being ... being dropped at six in the morning and picked up at six 
in the evening. The school system on its own, hiring part-time 
people and the like had to run a pre-school program, a post-school 
program. The teachers, the Assistant Principal and Principals 
that I dealt with were working incredibly hard. I worry that we 
have just gotten into the mode of blaming everything on the 
teachers and school system when the problems are much broader, I 
mean there are problems in the school system but it won't be 
solved by whether method A or method B is better for reading or 
that is going to be some magical cure. But, I do think that 
there is one thing that we just refuse to focus on and a lot of 
people have attended to this and it's a popular statement, but I 
really believe it's correct. 
If you look at the United States, we have our students in 
school K through 12 180 days a year. In ••• on the average in 
European countries, their students are in school 220 days per 
year. In Japan their students are in school 240 days per year and 
in Korea they're at 250 days per year, and what happens during a 
school day in Europe or in Japan is much more intense than what 
happens in the United states. I think I would be one who would 
advocate that we need to extend the school year. Students need 
more time in the schools and I think that would cost money and 
whether the Legislature, whether this Government, would ever say 
yes we need to spend that kind of money is another matter. 
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We've got a President who says he's the education President. 
Maybe he will march forward and raise the money to expand school 
programs. Imagine 180 days to 240. That's a 25 percent increase 
in the number of days in school, but it could really make a 
difference. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, I won't hold my breath on this 
President, but I will argue that on top of all that, year-round 
schools have provided a tremendous pressure in terms of dealing 
with those requirements and the over-crowded conditions that we 
face in the teacher-pupil ratio is also indicative and which 
brings those figures of 220, 240 and 250 even more pronounced by 
the quality of education provided during those days versus the 180 
days and the quality that we continue to provide. Thank you very 
much. 
CHANCELLOR ATKINSON: Thank you very much. 
c. Energy/Environmental Technology: 
California as Pacific Rim Leader 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Professor Gordon McDonald, Chief Scientist, 
MITRE Corporation. 
PROFESSOR GORDON J. F. McDONALD: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman. It is indeed a privilege to appear before you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Welcome to the Committee. 
PROFESSOR McDONALD: The topic I'm going to discuss or 
represent somewhat of a shift from the two prior discussions. And 
I'm going to try to focus in on two issues where I think 
California can play a leading role among the Pacific Rim 
countries. Much has appeared in the press over the last few years 
about global change and particularly about greenhouse warming. 
this week there's an international conference -- Oil/Climate 
Conference in Geneva. It will be followed by a ministerial 
meeting which will provide the basis for the beginning of a 
negotiation on a convention--the goal being to have a convention 
ready for signing the next United Nations Conference on 
Environment -- the follow-up to the Stockholm 1972 Conference. 
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That convention will undoubtedly include two kinds of 
prov1s1ons. One, probably a phased-in approach to the limitations 
of the emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide. 
The second, provisions for the protection of the tropical forests 
of thee world. In both cases, I think that these developments 
provide a very major opportunity for California, California 
industry and the California academic establishment. 
The limitations of emissions of carbon dioxide depend very 
heavily on the development of technology that is energy efficient. 
The more efficient you are in converting heat into useful product 
or work, the less greenhouse gas gets into the atmosphere. 
A little-known fact is that over the past fifteen years, 
basically since the oil crisis of 1 73, the U.S. industrial 
component has become more efficient at the rate of about 2% to 3% 
each year. That is, we are using less energy to produce more 
goods. This is a benefit environmentally .•. a benefit 
economically. 
A very large part of that increased efficiency has come out 
of research and development carried forward in California and 
particularly in the California aerospace industry. The 
development of new materials and new processes that gradually 
diffuse into other industries has increased the efficiency of u.s. 
industry a significantly, and thus lowered the percentage of 
greenhouse gases that the u.s. contributes. 
There is, I believe, a very large opportunity for selling 
energy-efficient industrial processes abroad, particularly in the 
developing countries in the Pacifc -- Philippines, Indonesia, 
throughout Latin America and PRC. There's a very important 
question of how that technology is transferred--how the U.S. 
effectively gets in to make sure is that thos inndustrial 
processes penetrate the market. There is a bit of an effort 
within the Federal Government. There is a committee that is 
looking into the transfer of environmedntally sensible technology 
and what can be done to promote it. I think within California, we 
have an opportunity, both within industry and within the 
university community, of making knowledge of these technologies 
known, making it clear that that kind of technology is important 
if indeed that the requirements of the upcoming convention are to 
be met, if the environmental goals that are going to be set 
internationally are going to be met. 
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The second area, 1 forests, also an urea in which 
I think California can play a very significant role. The problem 
in the destruction of tropical forests has been imperfect 
management of forestry Forests can be managed in a way 
that they can be economically developed and developed in a way 
that's environmentally sound. Those techniques of management have 
evolved to a very large extent California, both within the 
university community and within the timber industries in 
California. 
once, again, I believe that it is important that these 
technologies be made available in order to aid the economic 
development of countries, aparticularly in the tropical regions of 
the world, and in order to minimize the environmental disbenefits 
of improper forest management. 
Those are the two areas where I think California can make 
very significant improvements. We probably need some unified 
approach either it's an institution based within the university or 
institution that involves an industry and the university, to make 
information available to countries that can make use of these 
technologies. I think there an opportunity for growing 
markets. One in which California can play an important role. I 
also think it's which there's going to be increasing 
competition. In years ago when in Japan 
we'd talk about very often the audience 
would break into smiles and say, "This is a wonderful business 
opportunity, because we can make things that are very efficient". 
But in fact, right now, the u.s. l processes are digging 
out Japan. And we have to make that fact known, get that 
technology into the hands or the knowledge about that 
technology -- into the hands of potential users. So, I would 
single out these two areas that are going to receive attention 
within the international discussions in a time-scale of two years 
and really set the stage for California to play an important role 
making available those technologies and getting them into the 
countries where they can be used. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Professor McDonald, I'm very much 
appreciative of those comments. I serve as Chairman of the Taxies 
Committee in the Senate and I have travelled to most of the 
countries innumerable times in the Pacific Rim region. Not only 
on the Latin American side, but also on the Asian side. And as I 
sit down when the technocrats, whether it be in Taiwan or whether 
it be in Hong FKong or whether it be in Japan or other areas, I 
see so fervently the need for technology that I'm aware of (which 
I think is far superior to German technology or Italian scrubbing 
technology in terms of incineration) that's not being brought to 
those regions. There can be tremendous advantages not only is a 
good public relations force for California, but clearly as a good 
econimic advantage for California. 
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When I sat down with the Director of the Environment in 
Taipei and realized only that only 13% of that population is on a 
sewage system in that country, and seeing the technology they were 
using that we've already rejected here for environmental reasons 
in terms of incineration, it frustrated me in terms of how we 
begin to put those two environments together to forge a new 
agenda--which is environmentally sounder with respect to their 
needs. 
When you speak of institutions to bridge that gap, obviously 
an academic foundation come to mind because it's almost a neutral 
territory. And, sometimes I'm of the opinion that government 
doesn't always do things properly or right or efficiently. What 
kind of institution--have you given some thought that perhaps 
those of us in the Legislature that are like-thinking could 
promote and support? 
PROFESSOR McDONALD: Yes. I 
university-based University 
clearinghouse with several functions. 
would look at it as 
of California-based 
a 
1. To maintain a continuing inventory of environmental 
technologies to maintain a listing of potential customers. Taiwan 
as you bring out, is really a country in which they are almost 
overwhelmed by their own waste; and they do not know how to deal 
with it. 
2. For the university clearinghouse to attemtp to provide a 
linkage between the u.s. California-based producers of the 
products and industries and processes, and the potential users in 
other countries. And I think it's largely a question of getting 
inforamtion to flow both ways. Countries abroad, whether it's 
Taiwan or Korea, are not aware of the technologies that exist 
today, that are in use today, that are much cheaper and more 
efficient than the technologies that are being sold by the Germans 
in particular, and we need to make that kind of linkage. And I do 
think the university-based clearing house should have the role of 
collecting information about potential users around the Pacific 
Rim and trying to make those linkages. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Costs? 
PROFESSOR McDONALD: And the cost, and this is very much of 
the back of the envelope calculation that I did last week, would 
run about $2 million a year. It's, I think, a relatively small 
investment with a potential very large payoff. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Which would provide an incentive for the 
private sector to help finance? 
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PROFESSOR McDONALD: Yes, I think in the longer ~erm you want 
private sector participation, but in order to maintain the 
required neutralities so that particular industries do not feel 
they're either favored or disfavored--I would base it within the 
university setting. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right, thank you very much. 
PROFESSOR McDONALD: Thank you. 
D. Information/Communications Infrastructure Development 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Robert De Martini, Director, World Trade 
Commission, Susan Estrada, Executive Director, Californai 
Education and Research Federation Network, please come forward. 
What's our time frame here? susan, do you want to start off? 
SUSAN ESTRADA: Sure, thank you for this opportunity today. 
My name is Susan Estrada. I'm the Executive Director of the 
California Education and Research Federation, CERFnet known 
affectionately as. Our motto ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: CERFNET? 
MS. ESTRADA: CERFnet. Our motto marries the cry of the 
surfer and the happy computer user, Cerfs Up. I'd like to welcome 
you all to San Diego on behalf of CERFnet. My organization and 
the San diego supercomputer Center, in the building just over 
here, where we have our hadquarters, are identified in AB 2852 as 
two of several organizations already in place and able to assist 
in cooperation and technological leadership for the Pacific Rim 
through the proposed Global Applied Technology Extension Service. 
We are not just eager to help, we are chomping at the bit and I'd 
like to explain why. 
The San Diego Supercomputer Center, SDSC, was born six years 
ago when an aggressive consortium of representatives of commerce, 
the universities, and government obtaind major funding from the 
National Science foundation and the State of California. The 
mision was twofold: To provide access to supercomputing to a 
supercomputer starved academic research community, and to give 
leadership in promoting university, industry and government 
collaboration in computational science and engineering. You might 
think that the logical thing to do wa to divide the access 
question from the leadership question and set up CERFnet as a way 
of facilitating access, but that's not how history went, and, as 
it turn, out, we're very glad that it didn't, because the two 
questions aren't really separable. 
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CERFnet was born two and a half years ago with a grant from 
the National Science Foundation as a midlevel network, part of the 
Internet, which provides access for scientists and engineers to 
the NSFnet, a backbone network linking five supercomputer centers 
across the country as well over twenty midlevel networks. SDSC is 
the only supercomputer center with a direct connection to this 
backbone in the West, although the Internet also extends to many 
other supercomputer centers throughout the nation. CERFnet, like 
SDSC, is a project administeered by an industrial research firm, 
General Atomics, a company with a long history in leading-edge 
technology located very close to here. 
Both SDSC CERFnet combine the functions of providing access 
and leadership and it's a lucky think they do, because the form of 
the access can play a very large role in determining the breadth 
and the scope of the leadership. CERFnet now connects five 
campuses of the University of California and the University of 
California office of the President, all but one the twenty state 
university campuses, several research laboratories, and twenty-two 
industrial sites. Every one of those sites can have instant 
access to the MELVYL catalog of the University of California 
Library, which includes the California State Library holdings, 
because that is a valued-added service of CERFnet. 
But what does that mean? It means that it's possible for a 
researcher sitting at a workstation in a pharmaceutical firm to 
perform a calculation on the San Didgo Supercomputer and to see 
recent references to the compund that is being calculated on the 
Current Contents database available to MELVYL. Two windows on the 
workstation screen are as convenient as opening two publications 
on the same desk, but we have just made the desk as large as the 
University of California's multi-million volume library. The 
simple collation of two items of inforamtion, the result of the 
calculation and a journal refernce, could take the same researcher 
the better part of a day or even longer, if she had to drive over 
to the nearest UC library. That's a very simple example, but I 
think it's also very telling. The productivity and efficiency of 
our scientific and technological establishment can be multiplied 
many times by networking, and that's what CERFnet is trying to do. 
We couldn't ... 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Does that go in line with what Professor 
McDonald cited earlier in terms of a need or kiosk of information? 
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MS. ESTRADA: Yes. We couldn 1 t do it we were simply 
technical folks good at making connections from the back of one 
computer to the back of We have to be what we are, 
vitally interested ional science and 
the cornucopia of are flowing from the 
supercomputers across of weeks ago, the 
Interop conference of nation was held in San 
Jose, and CERFnet won Interop's award, for best network in 
the service sector. We were honored, and we have to 
attribute it to our commitment of research and 
engineering. 
As far as being part 1 ied Technology Extension 
Service, we are cut from cloth. We understand 
why at it can mean to world at the fingertips of a 
researcher, in Because we are already the 
result of university, and collaboration, we 
understand how to concentrate on the most important task, breaking 
down the barriers between the that are barriers to 
progress, while respecting the interest of each sector. 
we understand that we have numbers and counterparts 
in every country along the Pacific Rim, and both SDSC and CERFnet 
have engaged in exchanges of with many of them. Just 
last Thursday we were Habibie, the Indonesian 
Minister of Research and on the same day, an 
agreement in principal was the systems Engineering 
Research Institute at the Korea Institute of Technology. We 
expect a link between and SERI to be installed in the 
early part of next year. We have hosted delegations from 
universities and computer centers and government agencies from 
Japan, China, Korea, Austral all in the last six 
The CERFnet staff a mixture of nationalities 
native speakers of cantonese, Mandarin, Hindi, 
and, of course, English. 
believe that CERFnet been a powerful stimulant 
to transfer and various sectors of 
economy. One of our cooperation with 
Fullerton College, a community , and with NASA for access 
to NASA's giant Technology Transfer database for all CERFnet 
subscribers. Another one of our projects involves a partnership 
between the FredMail Foundation to provide a gateway between our 
two networks. The FredMail Foundation is oriented towards 
providing K-12 collaboration use of computers and 
networks throughout the nation and thee world and headquartered in 
San Diego. 
The establishment of the Global ied Technology Extension 
Service would mandate that we cement all of these relationships, 
including our Pacific Rim , and expand our activities to 
include access to shared informational resources on a global 
scale. 
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It should be possible for California businesses to get on to 
CERFnet, access one of the Extension databases, and find out, for 
example, the volume of shipping heavy goods between California and 
selected Asian ports over the last five years. It should be 
possible to command and to see such data in a clear graph, right 
in front of you, or to feed the data into an econometric model 
running on the supercomputer and obtain a realistic prediction of 
future trade. A network is an informational circulatory system, 
keeping alive the possibility of the happy coincidence of good 
minds and good information that issues in human advancement and 
progress. 
I hope that you're getting the impression from my description 
of the kinds of activities we are undertaking, that the 
legislation in AB 2852 is a close fit with what is already taking 
place in this field. There should be no hesitation at this 
threshold of opportunity. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you. Mr. De Martini. 
ROBERT DE MARTINI: Thank you, Senator. I'm Bob De Martini 
from the office of Export Development which is a unit of the World 
Trade Commission. I'm here today to talk about some of the 
information management that we've brought on line in the last four 
or five years of operations, some things that we're about to 
announce, and some things we hope to accomplish in the future. 
For those unfamiliar with the World Trade Commission, we're 
considered the agency in the State that's responsible for most 
matters pertaining to world trade in California. We fulfill this 
role through three areas of emphasis. One, through the office of 
Trade Policy and Research. We perform legislative advocacy in 
Sacramento and Washington. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Opposing some of my bills, I might add, but 
go ahead. 
MR. DE MARTINI: Two, through the Export Finance Office we 
administer a very aggtressive export finance program credited with 
supporting well over 200 million dollars of export sales that 
otherwise would have been lost; and, third, through the Office of 
Export Development, to which I am affiliated. We perform all 
marketing activities of the Commission. As information management 
falls primarily within the purview of this office, I hope to give 
you some insight to our efforts in the area. Our active marketing 
support focuses on facilitating participation by California 
companies in major foreign trade shows. We also work with foreign 
buyer match maker events. We produce a "Made in California" 
products catalog. We organize California stands in nearly 
twenty-five trade shows around the world each year on a 
predominantly cost recovery basis. 
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We take about 250 companies to these events. Our trade show 
program alone is credited by some independent studies with making 
over 150 million dollars in export sales that otherwise also would 
not have occurred, and these are from companies that have never 
exported before or are new to those markets that we've taken them 
to. We're also considered a model program within the United 
States compared to what other states are doing at this time. The 
success of our program can be in many ways attributed to our 
learning very early that we have to purchase, collect, 
build, or otherwise develop industry specific data bases of 
California companies in order to outreach our programs 
effectively. Today our data bases contain over 43,000 California 
companies which can be accessed by SIC codes, by key words, by 
location within the State. We use these data bases every day in 
promoting our program, soliciting participation in our events, 
matching foreign trade leads with California companies. We also 
use it to research specific industries. Because of the importance 
of these data bases to our program's success we continue to look 
for new ones wherever possible, to share information wherever 
possible, and to purchase and develop our own if we need to. 
As an adjunct to our data base work, we helped to create the 
California International Trade Register. The Register is a broad 
base directory of California companies that are currently involved 
in international business. The 1 ing of a company in the 
directory is free to Cali firm involuntary. Each 
company is listed wioth full contact inforamtion on the firm, the 
size of the company,their products and the foreign markets where 
they are active. The first edition which we produced last year, 
was the 1990 edition, had approximately 4300 companies. The 1991 
edition which is currently in final stages will have about 8,000 
companies registered. We'll feel pretty confortable once we have 
between 12 and 15,000 companies contained with the register. 
Because it is voluntary it's a big job on our part to get that 
message out to companies to encourage them to sign up. 
In addition to providing the book to California's foreign 
offices, we send a copy of the International Trade Register to all 
u.s. Embassies and Consulates abroad for use in their commercial 
libraries. Many of these libraries receive hundreds of visitors 
monthly seeking new suppliers from the United States. We also 
help to promote the book's availability in foreign publications 
and in our own Made In California magazine. 
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Due to the attraction of doing business with California firms, the 
private sector also produces a number of high quality directories 
of California companies. Included among these are the California 
Manufacture Register, which many of us will be familiar with, and 
the Southern California Business Directory. Through a partnership 
this year with the Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO, we 
facilitated the placement of an electronic version of both of 
these books in 28 business information centers throughout Japan. 
The data base lists over 24,000 California manufacturers and 
product suppliers which can be retrieved electronically again by 
SIC codes or by key words. 
My comments thus far have been about our collection and 
manipulation of data regarding California companies. Identifying 
and being able to efficiently reach these companies is very 
important to the success of our programs and any ongoing 
developments that we look towards. In mid-November the Office of 
Export Development will be introducing a new on-line system for 
companies seeking international business. The new system will 
allow any firm in California with a personal computer and a modem 
instant access to detailed export information and trade leads. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Through you, through the Commission? 
MR. DE MARTINI: Provided by us in a partnership with 
California State University of Fresno using ATINet which is a 
State on-line system. So, California companies will be able to 
retrieve market and industry research, export trade leads, 
information about existing Federal and State programs, and a 
calendar events of ... we're putting on with the federal 
Government .•. might be putting on, plus any sort of training 
seminard, symposium within the State of California will also be on 
the system. Referred to as the Automated Trade Library Service or 
ATLAS, the system utilizes the state-wide CSU network. The 
network allows almost any firm in this State access to ATLAS with 
a local phone call to any one of 19 California State University 
campuses. There is no cost to individuals or companies 
participating in the program, no fees, no monthly charges, no cost 
for information retrieval. The system is available 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year. During the week of November 12th we'll be 
conducting system previews to key trade groups, industry 
multipliers, colleges and universities, and State and Federal 
agencies in four regions of California. On the following Monday, 
November 19th, the system will be open for registration to any 
firm in the State. Though the system is free of charge, 
registrationn of users is necessary. This will allow us to 
restrict access to only California firms and to manage the system 
effectively. We'll be able to identify what sort of company's 
individuals are using the system, what files and information are 
accessed most frequently, what benefit results they received, and 
where improvement and expanisons of the system should be made. 
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We are readying resources and expectation that this initial 
launching of ATLAS will be followed by later releases which will 
take advantage of the enormous possibilities nationally and 
internationally that an on-line system such as this offers. The 
automated Trade Library Service will also have the technologicval 
capacity to support many of the initiatives put forth in the 
recently established Global Applied technology Extension Service, 
the GATES Initiative. 
There are a number of existing information systems currently 
available and others under development that would be of great 
value to those individuals and for seeking international exchange 
in greater global competitiveness. The greatest challenge to the 
World Trade Commission and th GATES Initiative is to coordinate 
linkages among State, Federal and foreign information networks for 
the betterment of information exchange. We certainly look forward 
to entering a dialogue between 1 these groups in order to 
explore methods of collecting, maintaining, and distributing 
information to targeted users wherever possible. 
As we move forward in this area, we will always remember that 
the programs that have been most successful with our office have 
been those that California industries have told us we should make 
available. it is very important that we keep our end uers in mind 
as we put information systems in place. We should never rely on 
our own assumptions and notions as to what is needed. In addition 
to an active dialogue among the various information providers, I 
encourage a similarly active dialogue with the end users of each 
of these systems. System users of any particular system want to 
get in, get their information and get out. If their entering and 
exit is impeded by too many menus, irrelevant data and 
information, potential users will unwilling to use the system 
and will offer little benefit. 
I will never advocate the ATLAS system or any other 
information system try to be all things to all people. The 
targeted users of each of these systems typically have dissimilar 
needs. Where there are areas of commonality, however, I hope free 
information exchanges will occur. I applied the effort to the 
committee and I look forward to answering any questions you might 
have. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What impact will you have in your action 
with the UC system? 
MR. DE MARTINI: I look forward to actually sitting down and 
talking to them about where we can be exchanging information. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 
already? 
Oh, you've set up meetings with them 
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MR. DE MARTINI: The first 
during the week of November 13th 
demonstrate our system to all 
managing systems and to see 
cooperation. 
system previews will be occurring 
and at that time we're looking to 
the different entities that are 
where we can have areas of 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What interaction are you going to have with 
the UC system? When do you have those meeting planned for? 
MR. DE MARTINI: The week of November 13th through the 16th. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In Berkeley, or? 
MR. DE MARTINI: We're in Sacramento, San Jose, Los Angeles, 
and San Diego. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you haven't highlighted particular 
campuses then? This is just,a general ... anybody can come to. I 
was asking more specific. 
MR. DE MARTINI: I'm sorry. Only multiplier groups, trade 
multiplier groups and the university systems. Also, the Federal 
Government through their u.s. Department of Commerce also are 
maintaining a lot of information that we hope to see where we can 
have future exchange. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 
adjourned. 
Ok, thanks very much. This hearing is 
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